Secure Boot Policy File Integrity via Staging Signatures

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current integrity management configurations, such as IMA, fail to secure policy files during vulnerable steps of the secure boot process, allowing malicious modifications and preventing legitimate updates, thereby compromising the security of Trusted Computing environments.

Innovation Solution

A method that loads root keys and verifies trusted keys before the integrity management configuration takes over, allowing secure loading and updating of immutable files by computing new signatures and storing them in a staging area for secure reboot, ensuring integrity and security during vulnerable steps.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the policy file is locked to prevent malicious modifications during vulnerable steps, then security is improved, but legitimate modifications and updates are prevented

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidlegitimate modifications
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by computing and storing signatures of the policy file in a staging area before the vulnerable steps of the boot process complete. This pre-computed signature enables later verification of both the original and modified policy files, allowing the system to securely accept legitimate modifications while preventing malicious changes during the vulnerable boot phase.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Device complexity

If integrity management configuration takes over after vulnerable steps, then secure boot process is simplified, but policy files remain susceptible to malicious modifications during vulnerable steps

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveboot process complexityVSAvoidpolicy file integrity
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extends preliminary action by preparing the policy file signature in advance (before vulnerable steps complete) and storing it in a protected staging area. This pre-prepared signature provides immediate integrity verification capability during the vulnerable period, bridging the gap before integrity management configuration takes control.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism - a staging area with signature storage - that operates between the policy file loading and the integrity management configuration takeover. This intermediary structure provides continuous integrity protection during the vulnerable transition period without requiring complex changes to the overall boot process architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Reliability

If the policy file remains unchanged to maintain integrity, then security is maintained, but system updates and policy changes cannot be applied

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveintegrityVSAvoidpolicy updates
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements feedback by computing a signature of the modified policy file and comparing it against the pre-stored signature from the staging area. This feedback mechanism verifies that modifications are legitimate and authorized, enabling the system to accept policy updates while maintaining integrity through cryptographic verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies parameter changes by using cryptographic signatures as a verification parameter. The signature serves as a digital parameter that changes with any modification to the policy file, enabling the system to detect and verify legitimate changes while preventing unauthorized modifications through signature validation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS11074348B2Securing and changing immutable data in secure bootup
Publication Date: 2021.07.27 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
  • US11074348B2 patent drawing
  • US11074348B2 patent drawing
  • US11074348B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A set of root keys is loaded as a first part of a secure boot process of a secure system. a first trusted key from a set of trusted keys is verified using a first root key from the set of root keys as a second part of the secure boot process. The set of trusted keys is loaded when an affirmative verification for a subset of trusted keys is received. The subset of trusted keys includes the first trusted key. As a third part of the secure boot process, an immutable portion of a file is validated using the first trusted key. As a fourth part of the secure boot process, the file is loaded when each portion of the file is successfully validated. The first, second, third, and fourth parts of the secure boot process occur before an integrity management configuration takes over the secure boot process.