Secure Channel Establishment with HW TEE Attestation Across Cloud Platforms

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (HW TEE) from different vendors lack interoperability, making it difficult to establish secure channels between software payloads and owners, and there is no guarantee that subsequent communications occur with the same attested payload, posing risks of unauthorized data provisioning.

Innovation Solution

A method is introduced to establish a secure channel by generating a nonce, mixing it with a payload public key, computing attestation, and using a non-authenticated key-agreement protocol to generate a session key, ensuring the authenticity of the payload and enabling secure data provisioning, with subsequent authentication mechanisms to maintain secure communication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If hardware-based TEE mechanisms from different vendors are used, then security protection for data in use is improved, but interoperability between different CSP platforms deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidinteroperability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a universal secure channel establishment method that works across multiple HW TEE vendors (Intel SGX, AMD SEV-SNP, ARM TrustZone) by defining a common protocol that abstracts vendor-specific attestation mechanisms. The owner device can establish secure channels with payloads running on any CSP platform without needing vendor-specific implementations, achieving multi-vendor interoperability while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

2Measurement precision

If basic attestation mechanisms are used to verify payload authenticity, then security verification is improved, but guarantee for subsequent authenticated communication deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattestation verificationVSAvoidsubsequent communication authentication
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary actions during the secure channel establishment phase by generating authentication credentials (public-private key pairs) and establishing cryptographic bindings between the owner device and the attested payload. These preliminary authentication mechanisms are set up before any data provisioning or communication occurs, ensuring that subsequent communications are automatically authenticated without requiring repeated attestation verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces cryptographic protocols and authentication credentials as intermediaries between the attestation mechanism and subsequent communications. The secure channel establishment process creates cryptographic bindings that mediate between the initial attestation verification and future communication authentication, allowing the system to leverage basic attestation mechanisms while ensuring reliable authenticated communication throughout the payload's execution lifecycle.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentEP4423969B1Method to establish a secure channel
Publication Date: 2025.07.16 THALES DIS FRANCE SA
  • EP4423969B1 patent drawingFigure 1
  • EP4423969B1 patent drawingFigure 2
  • EP4423969B1 patent drawingFigure 3~4

AI summary

The present invention provides a method to establish a secure channel between the owner of a software payload and the software payload itself when running into a hardware-based trusted execution environment, HW TEE, at the instance of a cloud service provider, the method comprising the following steps: • sending, by the owner, at least a nonce to the software payload; • generating, by the software payload, a payload key pair: public key and private key; • mixing, by the software payload, the payload public key with the nonce; • computing, by the HW TEE, an attestation using at least this nonce mixed with the payload public key; • sending, by the software payload, at least the attestation, and the payload public key to the owner; • verifying, by the owner, the attestation using the sent nonce mixed with the received payload public key; • generating, by the software payload and the owner, a session key between them; and • establishing a secure channel between the owner and the software payload running into the HW TEE.