Secure Circuit Provisioning via Cryptographic Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) face challenges in verifying that third-party manufacturers properly configure and provision electronic circuits, risking incorrect configuration, unauthorized product building, and confidential information leakage, especially when chips are configured and provisioned without OEM oversight.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of asymmetric public key cryptography and symmetric-key message authentication codes, such as HMAC, allows OEMs to securely configure and provision electronic circuits by verifying the authenticity of configuration and provisioning processes, ensuring only authorized quantities are produced and confidential information is protected, without requiring OEMs to configure chips in a trusted facility.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If the chip supplier sends chips directly to the third-party manufacturer without OEM involvement, then manufacturing efficiency and economy are improved, but the risk of incorrect configuration and unauthorized use increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by having the chip supplier pre-configure the chips with unique identifiers and encryption keys before shipping to the third-party manufacturer. This advance preparation enables the OEM to verify configuration accuracy remotely without needing to physically inspect or re-configure the chips, thus maintaining both efficiency and reliability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback mechanisms where the third-party manufacturer provides verification signals to the OEM after configuration, and the chip includes feedback channels to report configuration status. This allows the OEM to confirm that chips were configured correctly and only for authorized purposes, resolving the reliability concern while keeping the supply chain efficient.
2Reliability
If the OEM receives and configures chips before sending to third-party manufacturer, then configuration control is improved, but manufacturing time and expense increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary system consisting of secure communication channels and verification protocols that enable the OEM to maintain configuration control remotely. The chip supplier acts as a trusted intermediary that pre-configures chips according to OEM specifications, and the OEM verifies the configuration through cryptographic proofs without needing to physically handle or re-configure the chips, thus avoiding time delays.
3Adaptability or versatility
If the third-party manufacturer configures chips without OEM authorization, then manufacturing flexibility is improved, but the risk of unauthorized product building and information leakage increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by embedding cryptographic security features and unique identifiers in the chips during manufacturing. These pre-installed security mechanisms automatically prevent unauthorized configuration and product building by the third-party manufacturer. The chips include hardware-level authentication that rejects any configuration or operation not authorized by the OEM, thus countering potential harmful actions before they can occur.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces mechanical/physical control methods (OEM physically configuring each chip) with cryptographic and electronic verification systems. The third-party manufacturer uses encrypted communication and digital signatures to authorize configurations, and the chips verify authorization through cryptographic hardware. This substitution maintains manufacturing flexibility while eliminating information leakage risks associated with physical access and manual configuration.
4Productivity
If the third-party manufacturer builds more units than contracted, then production capacity utilization is improved, but the risk of unauthorized sales increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements feedback mechanisms where the third-party manufacturer's production system continuously reports unit counts and configuration status to the OEM through secure channels. The chips include counters and identification features that enable the OEM to verify the exact number of units manufactured and configured. This real-time feedback allows the OEM to detect and prevent unauthorized production beyond the contracted quantity, maintaining both high productivity and strict contract compliance.
Data Source
AI summary
To securely configure an electronic circuit and provision a product that includes the electronic circuit, a first entity (e.g., a chip manufacturer) embeds one or more secret values into copies of the circuit. A second entity (e.g., an OEM): 1) derives a trust anchor from a code signing public key; 2) embeds the trust anchor in a first circuit copy; 3) causes the first circuit copy to generate a secret key derived from the trust anchor and the embedded secret value(s); 4) signs provisioning code using a code signing private key; and 5) sends the code signing public key, the trust anchor, and the signed provisioning code to a third entity (e.g., a product manufacturer). The third entity embeds the trust anchor in a second circuit copy and causes it to: 1) generate the secret key; 2) verify the signature of the signed provisioning code using the code signing public key; and 3) launch the provisioning code. The OEM can authenticate the second circuit copy using the first circuit copy and a challenge/response protocol.