Secure N-Party Computation via Trusted Execution Environment and Shared Ledger
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Solution Overview
Problem
Secure multiparty computation protocols face challenges in ensuring fairness, particularly when a majority of participants are corrupt, and the use of intermediaries can lead to resource wastage and security threats.
Innovation Solution
A system and method utilizing a trusted execution environment (TEE) for secure real-time n-party computation, where parties communicate computation inputs and one-time keys, with a fallback process using a shared ledger to ensure fairness and security, eliminating the need for intermediaries.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a third party intermediary is used for multiparty computations, then security and fairness can be ensured, but resources are wasted in terms of the number of parties involved, the number of communications needed, and the possibility of collusion
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the intermediary function from the system by implementing a fallback mechanism that uses a shared ledger (blockchain) to guarantee fairness without requiring a trusted third party. The ledger stores cryptographic proofs and enables parties to verify computation fairness independently, eliminating the need for intermediary coordination while maintaining security guarantees.
Solution Approach 2:
The system enables parties to self-verify computation fairness through cryptographic proofs stored on the shared ledger. Each party can independently validate that the computation was performed correctly without relying on an intermediary to certify the result, thus reducing communication overhead and eliminating collusion risks associated with third-party intermediaries.
2Loss of information
If secure computation protocol is used, then confidentiality is maintained, but fairness cannot be provided when majority of participants are corrupt
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary actions by having parties deposit cryptographic commitments and proofs on the shared ledger before the computation begins. These preliminary commitments bind parties to their inputs and enable the fallback mechanism to guarantee fairness even if the computation is aborted, allowing the system to maintain both confidentiality and fairness in the presence of corrupt participants.
Solution Approach 2:
The system provides beforehand cushioning through the shared ledger, which stores cryptographic proofs that serve as a safety net. If a malicious party attempts to abort the computation after receiving the output, the honest parties can use the stored proofs on the ledger to recover the output independently, ensuring fairness is maintained despite the presence of corrupt participants.
3Reliability
If fallback computation process is implemented, then fairness is ensured when parties do not receive the one-time key, but additional communication and verification steps are required
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses the shared ledger as an intermediary that stores cryptographic proofs and enables automatic verification. When the fallback process is triggered, parties can retrieve pre-stored proofs from the ledger and verify fairness without extensive real-time communication, reducing the time penalty associated with the fallback mechanism while maintaining fairness guarantees.
Data Source
AI summary
Described are a system, method, and computer program product for secure real-time n-party computation. The method includes receiving a first computation input and a first portion of a one-time key from a first computer device, and receiving a second computation input and a second portion of the one-time key from a second computer device. The method also includes generating the one-time key based on the first and second portion of the one-time key, and executing a computation based on the first and second computation input. The method further includes generating an encrypted output by encrypting the computation with the one-time key, and communicating the encrypted output to the first computer device. The method further includes receiving a proof of publication from the first computer device and, in response to receiving the proof of publication, communicating the one-time key to the first computer device.