Self-Correcting Secure Computer System Memory Segmentation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current secure computer systems are vulnerable to persistent attacks due to the execution of operating systems from persistent memory, which is resource-intensive and time-consuming to verify, and encryption keys are susceptible to reverse-engineering if certain aspects of the encryption process are known.

Innovation Solution

A self-correcting secure computer system that loads a trusted operating system configuration from read-only memory (ROM) into volatile random access memory (RAM) during boot, automatically erases volatile memory upon shutdown or reboot, and disconnects from networks before accessing encryption protocols to protect key generation processes.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Duration of action of stationary object

If the operating system is stored in persistent memory, then the system can maintain data across reboots, but the system becomes vulnerable to persistent attacks and verification becomes resource-intensive and time-consuming

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata persistenceVSAvoidsecurity vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Duration of action of stationary objectVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the memory system into persistent storage (for OS images) and volatile RAM (for active execution). The OS is loaded from persistent storage into volatile RAM during boot, creating distinct security zones. This segmentation allows the system to maintain persistence benefits while isolating the attack surface to volatile memory only, resolving the contradiction between data persistence and security vulnerability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements preliminary verification of the OS image signature before loading it into volatile RAM. This pre-loading security check ensures that only authenticated OS versions are executed, preventing persistent attacks from compromising the system. The verification happens in advance during the boot process, maintaining both persistence and security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If the operating system is verified for integrity, then security is improved, but the process becomes resource-intensive and time-consuming

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidverification time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The OS image signature is verified preliminarily during the boot process before the OS is loaded into volatile RAM and before any user-space operations begin. This preliminary verification ensures security is established upfront, and subsequent operations can proceed without repeated verification overhead, balancing security with time efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses cryptographic hash verification where a compact signature (hash) of the OS image is compared against a stored reference. This copying approach allows rapid verification of the entire OS image integrity without re-examining all bytes, significantly reducing verification time while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

3Duration of action of stationary object

If encryption keys are stored in persistent memory, then key availability is maintained, but keys become susceptible to reverse-engineering

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey availabilityVSAvoidreverse-engineering risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Duration of action of stationary objectVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments key storage into persistent storage (for secure enclave enrollment) and volatile RAM (for active key operations). Encryption keys are generated and stored in a secure enclave during a one-time enrollment process, then used in volatile memory during operation. This segmentation maintains key availability while protecting against reverse-engineering by isolating keys from persistent attack vectors.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent employs a composite security architecture combining hardware secure enclaves, cryptographic operations, and volatile memory isolation. This composite approach layers multiple security mechanisms to protect keys - the secure enclave provides hardware-level protection, volatile memory provides runtime isolation, and cryptographic protocols provide mathematical security, collectively preventing reverse-engineering while maintaining availability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

4Adaptability or versatility

If network connections are maintained during encryption operations, then communication functionality is preserved, but encryption activities can be tracked or reported by malicious applications

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication functionalityVSAvoidtracking and reporting
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-generated harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent deactivates network connections preliminarily before initiating encryption operations and reactivates them afterward. This preliminary network isolation prevents malicious applications from tracking or reporting encryption activities in real-time, while the brief operational window maintains essential communication functionality. The network is restored after the sensitive operation completes, balancing security and adaptability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS11520655B1Systems and methods for self correcting secure computer systems
Publication Date: 2022.12.06 KEEP SECURITY LLC
  • US11520655B1 patent drawing
  • US11520655B1 patent drawing
  • US11520655B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A self-correcting secure computer system is provided. The computer system includes a read-only memory (ROM) device, a random access memory (RAM) device, and at least one processor in communication with the ROM device and the RAM device. The at least one processor is programmed to receive an activation signal; retrieve, from the ROM device, data to execute a first configuration including an encryption suite; execute, on the RAM device, the first configuration including the encryption suite; execute the encryption suite to generate a key; store the key at a first memory location; and delete volatile memory associated with the encryption suite.