Secure Element Software Updates With Rabin Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing secure element software update methods are inefficient and insecure, particularly for small chip architectures, as they require large footprints and lack adequate security measures for critical data deployment.
Innovation Solution
A method using Rabin signatures for authenticating and encrypting software updates, including multiple signature types for different functions, ensures secure and efficient software upload with reduced hardware requirements.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If GSMA remote provisioning architecture with SCP03t algorithm is used for authentication and encryption, then security protection is provided, but device complexity and memory footprint increase
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication process is segmented into two distinct phases: a provisioning phase that establishes security credentials, and an update phase that uses those credentials. This segmentation allows the complex SCP03t authentication to occur only during initial provisioning, while subsequent updates use simpler verification processes, reducing ongoing device complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
Security credentials and authentication mechanisms are established in advance during the provisioning phase before actual software updates occur. This preliminary action stores security context and credentials in the secure element, eliminating the need for repeated complex authentication exchanges during each update, thus reducing device complexity while maintaining security.
2Quantity of substance
If symmetric keys based authentication is implemented, then memory footprint is reduced, but security protection is decreased
Solution Approach 1:
Asymmetric key pairs are generated and stored in advance during provisioning. The public key is stored in the secure element while the private key remains on the provisioning server. This preliminary key establishment enables lightweight symmetric authentication during updates while maintaining the security benefits of asymmetric cryptography for key distribution.
Solution Approach 2:
Asymmetric cryptography acts as an intermediary mechanism that enables secure key exchange without requiring both parties to store complex authentication data. The public key serves as a mediator that can be freely distributed to enable secure communication while the private key remains securely stored on the server, reducing memory footprint on the device.
3Reliability
If multiple authentication exchanges are required between TRE and server, then security is enhanced, but productivity decreases
Solution Approach 1:
Multiple authentication exchanges and security context establishment are performed in advance during the provisioning phase. This preliminary action creates a secure channel and stores authentication credentials locally, allowing subsequent software updates to proceed with minimal authentication overhead, thus improving productivity while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The secure element uses stored credentials and security context to perform self-verification during updates without requiring continuous server interaction for authentication. This self-service capability allows the device to validate update integrity locally using pre-established security mechanisms, reducing communication overhead and improving update efficiency.
Data Source
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AI summary
The present invention relates to securely uploading a software image onto a secure element. An unprotected image package is generated from a software image, a manifest and a manifest signature. The unprotected image package consists of a sequence of tag length values, TLVs. A protected image package is generated based on an encryption key and the TLVs of the unprotected image package. A bound image package is then generated based on a plurality of data segmented from the protected image package and a first Rabin signature, and transmitted together with the first Rabin signature to the secure element.