Secure Evaluation Assembly for Fuel Dispensing Payment Data
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current end-to-end encryption (E2EE) systems in fuel dispensing and retail payment systems prevent merchants from accessing cardholder data for reconciliation and validation purposes, as data is encrypted and cannot be decrypted for clear-text viewing, and do not differentiate between payment and nonsensitive cardholder data.
Innovation Solution
A secure evaluation assembly (SEA) with antitampering control electronics and encrypted memory that decrypts and evaluates cardholder data, allowing access to nonsensitive data for local processing while maintaining E2EE for payment data, using different encryption methods and mechanisms to ensure security and compliance.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If end-to-end encryption (E2EE) is implemented to encrypt cardholder data at the input device, then security for payment cardholder data is improved, but merchants cannot access cardholder data for reconciliation and validation purposes
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments cardholder data into two categories: payment cardholder data (encrypted end-to-end) and nonsensitive cardholder data (accessible in clear text). This segmentation allows the system to maintain security for payment data while enabling merchants to access nonsensitive data for reconciliation and validation purposes without compromising overall security
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary component (such as a host system or processing intermediary) that receives encrypted payment cardholder data, decrypts it securely, performs necessary evaluations and reconciliations, and then re-encrypts the data before transmitting it to the payment network. This intermediary enables merchants to access necessary data for business operations while maintaining the security requirements of E2EE
2Reliability
If all cardholder data is encrypted at the input device, then security compliance is improved, but merchants cannot access loyalty card data for local processing
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies different quality treatments to different types of cardholder data based on their sensitivity and processing requirements. Payment cardholder data receives full encryption and security treatment, while loyalty card data is identified and processed with appropriate access permissions, allowing local processing of nonsensitive data without compromising security compliance
3Object-affected harmful factors
If end-to-end encryption is used to prevent data access, then fraud protection is improved, but merchants cannot verify PAN or manually complete transactions
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs an intermediary system that acts as a secure bridge between the encrypted input device and the merchant's processing system. This intermediary can securely retrieve payment cardholder data when needed for verification or manual transaction completion, perform necessary validations, and maintain the security chain while enabling legitimate merchant operations
Data Source
AI summary
A secure evaluation assembly in which an encrypted communication of cardholder data from an input device to a remote host processing system may be securely evaluated. The secure evaluation assembly includes antitampering control electronics and a memory. The secure evaluation assembly memory contains information needed to decrypt data encrypted according to a first encryption method and information needed to encrypt data according to a second encryption method. Further, the secure evaluation assembly memory is encrypted according to a third encryption method. The antitampering control electronics are operative to decrypt the secure evaluation assembly memory and are further operative to decrypt cardholder data encrypted according to the first encryption method to produce unencrypted cardholder data. Finally, the antitampering control electronics are operative to evaluate the unencrypted cardholder data and encrypt the unencrypted cardholder data according to the second encryption method if the unencrypted cardholder data is payment cardholder data.