Secure Fine Timing Measurement Exchange Protocol

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless communication networks are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where an intervening station can imitate another station during Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) exchanges, leading to fraudulent authentication and unauthorized access in positioning-based applications.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a secure FTM positioning protocol that uses encrypted FTM Range Report messages with a Dialog Token, ensuring only authenticated stations can participate in FTM exchanges, thereby preventing spoofing attacks by validating the authenticity of timing information and Dialog Tokens.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If FTM exchanges are implemented for positioning, then positioning accuracy is improved, but vulnerability to spoofing attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepositioning accuracyVSAvoidsecurity against spoofing attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

A position server acts as an intermediary between stations during FTM exchanges. The server receives FTM range reports, verifies their authenticity, and validates timing information against expected values. This intermediary mechanism allows accurate positioning to proceed while preventing spoofing attacks, as the server mediates the trust relationship between participating stations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms where stations send FTM range reports containing timing information back to the position server. The server provides feedback by validating these reports and comparing timing information against expected values based on known station positions. This feedback loop enables continuous verification of authenticity while maintaining positioning accuracy.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Reliability

If encryption and authentication protocols are added to FTM exchanges, then security is improved, but protocol complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against spoofing attacksVSAvoidprotocol complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Stations perform self-verification by generating and validating their own timing information and digital signatures. Each station independently creates FTM range reports with embedded timing data and cryptographic signatures, then verifies their own authenticity before submission. This self-service approach enhances security without requiring complex external verification mechanisms, reducing overall protocol complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentEP3424232B1Secure fine timing measurement exchange
Publication Date: 2021.02.17 QUALCOMM INC
  • EP3424232B1 patent drawingFigure 1A
  • EP3424232B1 patent drawingFigure 1B
  • EP3424232B1 patent drawingFigure 2

AI summary

Techniques for providing a secure Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) exchange between two wireless transceivers are disclosed. An example of a method according to the disclosure include transmitting a protected FTM range request message with a Dialog Token of a FTM frame, receiving a protected FTM range report message from a station, wherein the protected FTM range report message includes FTM information, and authenticating the station based at least in part on the FTM information included in the protected FTM range report message.