Secure IC Testing via SLEEVE and SAPHE Modules

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Solution Overview

Problem

The semiconductor industry faces significant security risks due to the outsourcing of chip fabrication and testing to untrusted foundries and testing facilities, where malicious entities can exploit vulnerabilities to steal design secrets, clone ICs, and compromise the supply chain, as existing locking, encryption, and authentication mechanisms are ineffective in mitigating attacks.

Innovation Solution

A secure reconfigurable key provisioning architecture (SLEEVE) module and a secure asset provisioning hardware entity (SAPHE) module are integrated into the IC, along with a security wrapper, to control operation modes and provide secure testing and provisioning, using encoding/decoding modules, unlocking patterns, and microcontrollers to ensure secure communication and asset management.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of manufacture

If chips are outsourced to third-party foundries for fabrication, then fabrication cost is reduced, but security risks increase due to untrusted environments

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefabrication costVSAvoidsecurity risks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The design is segmented into multiple IP blocks, each independently locked with unique keys. This allows the chip to be fabricated in untrusted foundries while maintaining security through distributed key management and modular architecture

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A trusted provisioning entity acts as an intermediary between the design owner and untrusted foundries. This entity securely distributes locked IP blocks and keys to authorized manufacturers, enabling cost-effective outsourcing while mitigating security risks through controlled key distribution

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If logic locking is applied to protect IP blocks, then design secrets are protected, but testing and provisioning become more complex

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedesign secret protectionVSAvoidtesting and provisioning complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

A universal key management infrastructure is implemented that handles multiple IP blocks with different keys through a single provisioning interface. The testing system can selectively unlock and test individual IP blocks or the entire chip using a standardized key distribution mechanism, reducing overall complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The locked IP blocks contain self-verification logic that automatically checks key validity and unlocks functionality without external intervention. During testing, the system autonomously manages key distribution and IP block activation, reducing manual provisioning complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If chips are unlocked for functional testing, then testing completeness is improved, but vulnerability to attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetesting completenessVSAvoidattack vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The chip implements dynamic key management where unlocking status changes based on testing progress and authorization levels. IP blocks are unlocked temporarily for specific test sequences and automatically re-locked afterward, enabling comprehensive testing while minimizing exposure time to attacks

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

Different regions of the chip (individual IP blocks) have different security states simultaneously. Critical blocks remain locked while non-critical blocks are unlocked for testing, allowing selective access that maintains overall security while achieving testing objectives

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

4Object-affected harmful factors

If multiple keys are used to lock different IP blocks, then security is improved, but key management becomes more difficult

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity levelVSAvoidkey management
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

A trusted provisioning entity serves as an intermediary that manages the distribution and tracking of multiple keys. This entity maintains a secure database mapping keys to specific IP blocks and authorized recipients, simplifying key management operations while maintaining high security through centralized control

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms where the provisioning entity receives status information about key usage and IP block unlocking states. This feedback enables automated key rotation, revocation, and distribution decisions, reducing manual management burden while maintaining security

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS11899827B2Establishing trust in untrusted IC testing and provisioning environment
Publication Date: 2024.02.13 UNIV OF FLORIDA RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC
  • US11899827B2 patent drawing
  • US11899827B2 patent drawing
  • US11899827B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system for secure testing and provisioning of an integrated circuit (IC) includes, in part, a secure reconfigurable key provisioning architecture (SLEEVE) module disposed in the IC, and a secure asset provisioning hardware entity (SAPHE) module. The IC may include, in part, a modified IEEE 1500 wrapper to control its operation modes. The SLEEVE module may include, in part, an encoding/decoding module and an unlocking module. The encoding/decoding module may include, in part, a decode key stream cipher module, an encode key stream cipher module, Seed Key programmable linear-feedback shift registers (LFSRs), Initialization Vector (IV) LFSRs, and configuration registers. The encoding/decoding module may be configured to generate key bits for decoding and encoding inputs and outputs of the IC. The unlocking module may include, in part, a pattern matching block and a counter. The unlocking module may be configured to enable write access to the configuration registers. The SAPHE module may include, in part, a microcontroller, a logging module, a provisioning module, and a communications module. The SAPHE module may be configured to interact with the IC to obtain a status of the IC during a testing and provisioning process. The logging module may include, in part, dedicated memory segments to store values for configuring the SLEEVE module and unlocking patterns for enabling write access to the configuration registers. The provisioning module may include, in part, a content accessible memory (CAM) module to store encrypted test patterns and encoded asset provisioning vectors for intellectual property (IP) blocks in the IC.