Secure Interface Control for Guest Instruction Interpretation
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
In cloud computing environments, there is a security concern regarding untrusted access to customer data by cloud providers and administrators through hypervisors, which can compromise sensitive information during virtual machine operations.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure interface control using millicode that intercepts and manages guest instructions, preventing the hypervisor from directly accessing secure virtual machine data, and ensuring that responses from the hypervisor are stored in a secure memory portion inaccessible to the hypervisor, thus maintaining data security without altering existing VM, OS, or hypervisor functionality.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If the hypervisor directly accesses virtual machine data to interpret instructions, then instruction interpretation efficiency is improved, but security of customer data deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a secure interface control as an intermediary component between the hypervisor and secure virtual machine data. This secure interface control includes a secure buffer that the hypervisor can write responses to, while only the secure interface control can read from secure virtual machine memory. This mediator architecture allows the hypervisor to participate in instruction interpretation without directly accessing protected data, thus maintaining both efficiency and security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the memory access permissions by creating distinct secure and non-secure portions of memory. The secure virtual machine's memory is divided such that certain portions are accessible only by the secure interface control, while the hypervisor can only access non-secure portions. This segmentation allows instruction interpretation to proceed while preventing unauthorized data access.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If the hypervisor is prohibited from accessing secure virtual machine data, then data security is improved, but instruction interpretation capability deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The secure interface control acts as a mediator that enables the hypervisor to interpret instructions in secure virtual machines without direct data access. The hypervisor writes interpretation responses to a secure buffer through the intermediary, maintaining its instructional capability while respecting security boundaries.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent adds a new dimension to the hypervisor-VM interaction by introducing a secure buffer layer. Instead of direct one-to-one access, the system creates a two-layer communication path where the hypervisor communicates with the secure interface control through the buffer, enabling instruction interpretation in a previously inaccessible secure dimension.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If a secure interface control is introduced to prevent hypervisor access, then security is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments memory into secure and non-secure portions with clearly defined access permissions. This segmentation provides a simple, rule-based access control mechanism that reduces the need for complex security management logic, as the segmentation itself enforces the security policy.
Solution Approach 2:
The secure interface control is implemented as part of the secure virtual machine's own control structure, allowing it to self-manage its security boundaries. The secure interface control automatically handles the buffering and permission enforcement without requiring external security management, reducing overall system complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
According to one or more embodiments of the present invention, a computer implemented method includes executing, by a virtual machine that is executing on a host server, a stream of instructions, wherein an instruction from the stream of instructions is to be intercepted to a hypervisor. The method further includes, based on a determination that the virtual machine is a secure virtual machine, preventing the hypervisor from directly accessing any data of the secure virtual machine. The method further includes performing by a secure interface control of the host server, based on a determination that the instruction is not interpretable by the secure interface control itself, extracting one or more parameter data associated with the instruction from the secure virtual machine, and storing the parameter data into a buffer that is accessible by the hypervisor. The instruction is subsequently intercepted into the hypervisor.