Secure Key Exchange for Mobile Devices

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current password-based encryption mechanisms, such as EKE, PDM, and SPEKE, are limited in their implementation and do not address the need for mobile devices, particularly in ensuring perfect forward secrecy, where past session keys remain secure even if long-term keys are compromised.

Innovation Solution

The implementation of a method using strong password-based authentication, specifically SPEKE, to establish a secure communication path between mobile devices and message centers, enabling perfect forward secrecy through a re-key sequence that generates new keys without compromising previous ones, using a shared secret exchanged via out-of-band communication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional password-based encryption mechanisms (EKE, PDM, SPEKE) are used, then authentication can be established, but perfect forward secrecy cannot be ensured

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveperfect forward secrecyVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by pre-establishing a shared secret through out-of-band communication before the actual key exchange. This preliminary shared secret is then used to derive multiple session keys, ensuring that past keys remain secure even if future keys are compromised. The shared secret is established in advance through secure physical or manual means, creating a foundation for perfect forward secrecy without requiring complex real-time key management.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If re-keying operations are implemented to provide perfect forward secrecy, then security is improved, but computational overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesession key securityVSAvoidcomputational energy consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies parameter changes by transforming a single shared secret into multiple different session keys through cryptographic derivation functions. Each session key is generated by changing parameters (such as incorporating timestamps, sequence numbers, or random nonces) into the key derivation process. This allows the system to provide perfect forward secrecy where each session key is unique and independent, while reusing the same underlying shared secret, thereby reducing computational overhead compared to generating entirely new key pairs for each session.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If strong password-based authentication is used, then security is enhanced, but implementation complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoidimplementation ease
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of manufacture

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies the intermediary principle by introducing a shared secret as a mediator between the authentication phase and the key exchange phase. The shared secret, established through out-of-band communication, serves as an intermediary that enables both parties to authenticate each other and derive session keys without directly exchanging sensitive authentication data over the insecure channel. This intermediary shared secret simplifies the implementation by separating the authentication mechanism from the key derivation process, making the system both secure and easier to implement.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS7646872B2Systems and methods to securely generate shared keys
Publication Date: 2010.01.12 MALIKIE INNOVATIONS LTD
  • US7646872B2 patent drawing
  • US7646872B2 patent drawing
  • US7646872B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for secure bidirectional communication between two systems is described. A first key pair and a second key pair are generated, the latter including a second public key that is generated based upon a shared secret. First and second public keys are sent to a second system, and third and fourth public keys are received from the second system. The fourth public key is generated based upon the shared secret. A master key for encrypting messages is calculated based upon a first private key, a second private key, the third public key and the fourth public key. For re-keying, a new second key pair having a new second public key and a new second private key is generated, and a new fourth public key is received. A new master key is calculated using elliptic curve calculations using the new second private key and the new fourth public key.