Secure Key Handling for SoC Software Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
The exposure of private keys in embedded devices poses a significant security threat, as they are used for authenticating software, and existing methods do not adequately protect against insider attacks or limit access to cryptographic equipment.
Innovation Solution
A method is introduced where an image generator and signature generator, programmed into a special-purpose computer, use public keys and hashes to create signatures for boot images, ensuring that only public keys and their signatures are exposed, while keeping private keys secure within a Hardware Security Module (HSM).
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If private keys are stored in embedded devices for software authentication, then authentication functionality is enabled, but security vulnerability increases due to exposure of private keys
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the private key storage function from the embedded device and relocates it to a remote HSM. The embedded device only stores and processes public keys, while the HSM securely stores private keys and performs cryptographic operations. This extraction eliminates the harmful factor of private key exposure in the embedded device while maintaining authentication functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an HSM as an intermediary component between the embedded device and the cryptographic operations. The HSM acts as a secure intermediary that performs private key operations remotely, allowing the embedded device to authenticate software without directly accessing or storing private keys, thus reducing security vulnerability.
2Ease of operation
If private keys are stored locally in embedded devices, then authentication process is simplified, but vulnerability to insider attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts private key storage from the embedded device to a remote HSM, eliminating the ability of insiders within the embedded device to access or compromise private keys. The authentication process remains simplified from the application perspective, as the HSM provides secure cryptographic operations without requiring complex local key management.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent moves the cryptographic operation from a local two-dimensional (device-level) operation to a remote three-dimensional (cloud-based HSM) operation. This dimensional change allows the embedded device to maintain ease of operation for authentication while eliminating insider attack vulnerability by placing private keys in a remote, physically secure environment.
3Speed
If cryptographic operations are performed locally in embedded devices, then processing speed is improved, but key security exposure increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a remote HSM as an intermediary that performs cryptographic operations securely. While the HSM is remote, it provides secure private key operations without exposing keys to the embedded device. The system maintains processing efficiency by establishing secure communication channels and using optimized cryptographic protocols for remote operations.
Data Source
AI summary
A method relating generally to generating a boot image, as performed by an information handling system, for an embedded device is disclosed. This method includes a public key obtained by a boot image generator. A first hash for the public key is generated by the boot image generator. The first hash is provided to a signature generator. A first signature for the first hash is generated by the signature generator. A first partition for the boot image is obtained by the boot image generator. A second hash for the first partition is generated by the boot image generator. The second hash is provided to the signature generator. A second signature for the second hash is generated by the signature generator. The boot image generator and the signature generator are programmed into the information handling system. The boot image includes the public key, the first signature, and the second signature. The boot image is output from the information handling system.