Secure Multiparty Computation Integrity Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing secure multiparty computation protocols face challenges in detecting and managing dishonest parties, particularly in scenarios with malicious behavior, and require significant computational complexity, especially when dealing with semi-honest or malicious adversaries.

Innovation Solution

The proposed method involves a system and method for secure computations where multiple computational processes share information and perform arithmetic computations on records, with each process verifying the integrity of partial records through combined encryptions and cryptographic keys, allowing detection of deviations and ensuring the accuracy of computations without revealing inputs, using protocols that are time-efficient and cost-effective.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If existing secure multiparty computation protocols are used to detect and manage dishonest parties, then security against malicious behavior is improved, but computational complexity increases significantly

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against malicious behaviorVSAvoidcomputational complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The protocol segments the verification process into local integrity checks performed by each party on their own partial records, rather than requiring complex global verification. Each party independently verifies their partial records using cryptographic proofs, dividing the computational burden while maintaining overall security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The protocol performs preliminary verification of partial records before the main computation phase. By verifying integrity of shared secrets and partial records in advance using cryptographic commitments and proofs, the system prevents malicious parties from introducing errors later, reducing the need for complex post-computation verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If existing secure multiparty computation protocols are used to verify integrity of partial records, then detection of deviations by dishonest parties is improved, but communication overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection of deviationsVSAvoidcommunication overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The protocol uses cryptographic commitments as copies of the original secrets. Each party creates cryptographic commitments (hashes or encrypted forms) of their partial records and shares these commitments with other parties. These commitments serve as verifiable copies that allow integrity checking without requiring parties to share or transmit the actual secret data, minimizing communication overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The protocol implements feedback mechanisms where parties exchange cryptographic proofs of integrity during the computation process. Each party provides feedback in the form of verification proofs that their partial records remain intact, allowing other parties to detect deviations without extensive communication. The feedback is streamlined through efficient cryptographic verification protocols.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS10885205B2Secure multiparty computation
Publication Date: 2021.01.05 NEC CORP
  • US10885205B2 patent drawing
  • US10885205B2 patent drawing
  • US10885205B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for performing secure computations on records, comprising: receiving a request to apply an arithmetic computation on a record; assigning a respective partial record to each of a plurality of computational processes; instructing each of the computational processes sharing a computation scheme to perform the following: submitting the arithmetic computation to the computation scheme to assemble a processed partial record from the respective partial record components; instructing each of the plurality of computational processes to verify an integrity of at least one of the plurality of processed partial records by: broadcasting combined encryptions of one of the plurality of processed partial record components to all other of the plurality of computational processes and analyzing received combined encryptions to detect integrity in the other of the processed partial record components; and when the detected integrity is valid, calculating a response to the request by combining the received processed partial records.