Secure Search Query Generation Using Truncated Cryptographic Hashes
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Solution Overview
Problem
Traditional search query systems expose sensitive information when searching databases, posing a security risk due to the need to expose search terms directly to databases and other systems.
Innovation Solution
A computing system generates a cryptographic hash value for sensitive data, truncates it based on a signature anonymization value to create a secure search query, allowing for secure searches across different data regions without exposing the original data, using k-anonymity to ensure multiple matches and prevent attacks like rainbow table attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional search queries expose search terms directly to databases, then search functionality is simple and direct, but sensitive information security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces cryptographic hash functions as intermediaries between the search system and database. Instead of directly exposing sensitive search terms to the database, the system transforms them into hash values that serve as secure proxies. This intermediary layer maintains search functionality while preventing direct exposure of sensitive information, thus resolving the contradiction between security and simplicity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the search term from its original form into a cryptographic hash representation, changing the parameter form of the data. This transformation allows the search system to operate on hash values rather than raw sensitive data, improving security while maintaining the essential search capability through modified data representation.
2Reliability
If cryptographic hash values are truncated to ensure k-anonymity, then information security and anonymity are improved, but search precision may be reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies partial action by truncating only a portion of the cryptographic hash value rather than using the complete hash. This partial use of the hash (e.g., using only the first few characters) provides sufficient anonymity (k-anonymity) while maintaining enough discriminatory power to enable accurate search matches. The truncation level is carefully chosen to balance security and precision.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameter of the hash value from full-length to truncated length, creating a new parameter state that balances anonymity and precision. By adjusting the truncation parameter, the system can control the degree of anonymity while preserving sufficient information for accurate matching, thus resolving the contradiction between security and precision.
3Measurement precision
If complete signature values are used for searching, then search accuracy is high, but sensitive data exposure risk increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the necessary portion of the cryptographic hash value (the truncated prefix) for search operations, leaving the complete hash and sensitive data securely stored elsewhere. This extraction approach provides sufficient search accuracy using only the extracted portion, while the remaining sensitive information remains protected and is not exposed during the search process.
Solution Approach 2:
The truncated hash prefix serves as an intermediary representation that enables accurate searching without exposing the complete signature or sensitive underlying data. This intermediary form maintains the essential matching capability while reducing the exposure risk associated with using complete signature values in search queries.
Data Source
AI summary
Generating a first signature value corresponding to a first dataset stored in a first data region having a first access permission level. Determining a signature anonymization value. Truncating the first signature value based on the signature anonymization value. Generating a secure search query for identifying, based on the truncated first signature value, second signature values corresponding to entries of a second dataset stored in one or more second data regions having one or more second access permission levels. Receiving a response to the secure search query including the plurality of second signature values. Determining the entries of the second dataset from the second signature values. Comparing the respective entries of the second dataset to the at least a portion of the first dataset. Generating one or more notifications based on the comparisons indicating a potential match between a particular respective entry of the second dataset and the at least a portion of a first dataset.