Secure Offline Storage of Shared Secrets Using Asymmetric Segmentation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing data storage security approaches fail to securely store shared secrets in a way that allows recovery after system failure or exit without compromising the secret to attackers, as they either lose the key or make both the encrypted secret and decryption key vulnerable to attackers.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method where a shared secret is encrypted with the public key of a peer system and stored, allowing recovery by decrypting it with the private key, keeping the encrypted secret and decryption key on different systems to prevent unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the shared secret is stored on a storage disk, then the secret can be recovered after system failure, but an attacker can retrieve the secret value from the storage
Solution Approach 1:
The secret is segmented into two parts: encrypted secret data and decryption key. These segments are stored on separate systems (different storage disks), so that neither segment alone can compromise security while both are needed for recovery. This resolves the contradiction by enabling recovery without exposing the full secret to attackers.
Solution Approach 2:
A cryptographic intermediary mechanism is introduced where the secret is encrypted with a public key before storage. The decryption key (private key) acts as an intermediary that enables recovery without being stored with the encrypted data. This mediator approach allows secure recovery while preventing attacker access.
2Reliability
If the shared secret is encrypted with a symmetric key and saved on storage disk, then the secret can be recovered, but both the encrypted secret and decryption key are vulnerable if storage is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the cryptographic materials into two separate storage locations: the encrypted secret (using the peer's public key) is stored on one system's disk, while the decryption key (private key) is stored on the peer system's disk. This segmentation ensures that compromising one storage location does not expose both the encrypted data and its decryption key, resolving the vulnerability while maintaining recovery capability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies asymmetric cryptography (public-key cryptography) where the encryption and decryption use different keys. The secret is encrypted with the peer's public key, and only the peer's private key can decrypt it. This asymmetry ensures that even if one system's storage is compromised, the attacker cannot decrypt the secret without the other system's private key, thus resolving the contradiction between recoverability and security.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If the key is maintained in system memory without storage, then security is improved, but the key is lost if the system crashes or exits
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary encryption of the secret using the peer's public key before storage. This preliminary cryptographic transformation allows the secret to be stored securely on disk while maintaining the ability to recover it later through decryption with the private key. This resolves the contradiction by enabling persistent storage without compromising security or recoverability.
Solution Approach 2:
The public key encryption mechanism serves as an intermediary that bridges the gap between security and recoverability. The secret is transformed through this cryptographic intermediary before storage, allowing it to persist on disk while remaining secure. The private key acts as another intermediary that enables recovery without requiring the key to remain in memory, thus resolving the contradiction.
Data Source
AI summary
Methods, systems, apparatus and articles of manufacture for secure recoverable offline storage of a shared secret are provided herein. A method includes establishing a connection with a cryptographic device to access a first item of encrypted information maintained by the cryptographic device, wherein the first item of encrypted information comprises an item of cryptographic information encrypted with a first item of key information, decrypting the first item of encrypted information with a second item of key information to retrieve the item of cryptographic information, and encrypting the item of cryptographic information with a third item of key information to create a second item of encrypted information, wherein the third item of key information is associated with the cryptographic device.