Secure Subsystem Sensor-Based Cryptographic Key Authorization

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Solution Overview

Problem

As system-on-a-chip (SoC) designs become more complex with increased security mechanisms, existing architectures and trusted execution environments may become compromised, allowing unauthorized access to cryptographic information.

Innovation Solution

A secure subsystem within the SoC stores cryptographic keys and uses sensor information to determine if conditions for performing cryptographic functions are satisfied, thereby authorizing the use of cryptographic keys only when specific conditions are met.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional trusted execution environments are used, then cryptographic functions can be performed, but security may be compromised as attackers become familiar with existing architectures

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidarchitecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system divides the trust verification process into separate components: a secure subsystem that stores cryptographic keys and policies, and a service requesting environment that requests cryptographic functions. This segmentation isolates the most critical security functions from potential attacks on the broader system architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A secure subsystem acts as an intermediary between the service requesting environment and the cryptographic keys. This intermediary enforces key usage policies and sensor-based conditions, preventing direct access to keys even if the service requesting environment is compromised.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If sensor-based verification is added, then trust level increases, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetrust levelVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The secure subsystem serves multiple functions: storing cryptographic keys, enforcing key usage policies, receiving and evaluating sensor inputs, and authorizing cryptographic operations. This multi-functionality consolidates security-critical operations into a single component, managing complexity rather than increasing it.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary verification by evaluating sensor-based conditions before authorizing cryptographic key usage. This preliminary action ensures that security requirements are met before critical operations occur, preventing the need for complex post-authorization controls.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If multiple conditions are verified, then unauthorized access is prevented, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess controlVSAvoidverification time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Sensor-based conditions are evaluated before cryptographic key authorization is granted. This preliminary verification ensures that security requirements are met in advance, allowing faster processing when authorization is needed without compromising access control.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The secure subsystem autonomously evaluates sensor inputs against stored policies and makes authorization decisions without requiring external verification. This self-service capability reduces processing time by eliminating additional verification steps outside the secure subsystem.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS12273447B2Devices and methods utilizing sensor information for increased trust level
Publication Date: 2025.04.08 QUALCOMM INC
  • US12273447B2 patent drawing
  • US12273447B2 patent drawing
  • US12273447B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Various embodiments may include methods and systems for providing security on a system-on-a-chip (SoC). A method may include receiving, from a service requesting environment by a secure subsystem, a request to perform a cryptographic function, in which the secure subsystem stores a condition for performing the requested cryptographic function. The method may further include receiving, by the secure subsystem, an input from a sensing circuit that includes at least one indication relevant to the condition for performing the requested cryptographic function, determining, by the secure subsystem, whether the input indicates that the condition for performing the requested cryptographic function is satisfied, and performing the requested cryptographic function using a cryptographic key stored in the secure subsystem in response to determining that the condition is satisfied.