Secure System Manager for Processing Device Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing processing devices are vulnerable to malicious programs that exploit their broad accessibility, allowing undesirable and illegal functions, highlighting a need for enhanced security measures to control inputs, outputs, and commands executed by these devices.

Innovation Solution

A secure system manager is implemented, which includes a communication monitor, permitted and prohibited instruction records, and prohibitors to detect and restrict the execution of non-secure executable instructions, ensuring that only authorized actions are performed on secure data entities, thereby preventing unauthorized access and malicious activities.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If an operating system is made broadly accessible to support many programs, then the device's versatility and ease of operation improve, but the device becomes vulnerable to malicious programs and security threats

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprogram compatibilityVSAvoidsecurity vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system is divided into a secure system manager layer and an operating system layer. The secure system manager is segmented from the operating system to provide isolated security controls, allowing the OS to remain broadly accessible while the secure layer enforces security policies on program execution and data access.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The secure system manager acts as an intermediary between programs and the operating system. It monitors and controls program execution, data access, and system calls, blocking malicious activities while permitting legitimate operations, thus resolving the conflict between accessibility and security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If security restrictions are imposed to prevent malicious programs, then security improves, but program execution flexibility and ease of operation deteriorate

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidprogram execution flexibility
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The secure system manager dynamically adjusts security controls based on program behavior and context. Rather than imposing static restrictions, it monitors execution in real-time and applies security policies adaptively, maintaining flexibility for legitimate programs while blocking malicious activities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms where the secure system manager continuously monitors program execution and adjusts security decisions based on observed behavior. This feedback loop allows the system to distinguish between legitimate and malicious programs, maintaining ease of operation for valid programs while enforcing security restrictions when needed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS10013578B2Apparatus for processing with a secure system manager
Publication Date: 2018.07.03 WEST TEXAS TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS LLC
  • US10013578B2 patent drawing
  • US10013578B2 patent drawing
  • US10013578B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Method and apparatus for secure processing. The method includes detecting communication among secure and non-secure data entities, prohibiting execution of non-secure executable instructions on secure data entities unless the non-secure executable instructions are recorded in a permitted instruction record, and prohibiting execution of non-secure executable instructions if the non-secure executable instructions are recorded in a prohibited instruction record. The apparatus includes a processor, at least one non-secure data entity, and secure data entities including: a communication monitor adapted to detect communication among secure and non-secure data entities; a permitted instruction record; a first prohibitor adapted to prohibit execution of non-secure executable instructions on secure data entities unless the non-secure executable instructions are recorded in the permitted instruction record; a prohibited instruction record; and a second prohibitor adapted to prohibit execution of non-secure executable instructions if the non-secure executable instructions are recorded in the prohibited instruction record.