Secure Access Token Structure for Encrypted JWT Payloads

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing access tokens, such as JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), face security deficiencies due to insufficient encryption of sensitive data, impractical key management in asymmetric encryption systems, and limitations in compatibility across different computing platforms.

Innovation Solution

A modified JSON Web Encrypted Signed (JWES) token structure that allows partial encryption of data payloads, enabling secure communication across trust boundaries by encrypting sensitive data while maintaining compatibility with existing JSON Web Signature (JWS) formats, offloading decryption to a trusted token issuer.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If JWTs are used for access tokens, then the tokens are compact and easily extractable, but they do not provide sufficient security for sensitive information

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetoken extraction and usageVSAvoidsecurity for sensitive information
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by selectively encrypting only the sensitive data portions of the token payload while leaving other non-sensitive information in plaintext. This allows the token to maintain its compact structure and ease of extraction while providing targeted security protection for sensitive information fields.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the token payload into sensitive and non-sensitive portions, applying different security treatments to each segment. The sensitive data is encrypted using a content encryption key, while non-sensitive data remains accessible in plaintext, thus balancing security requirements with operational convenience.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If JWS is used for authentication, then the tokens can be verified with signatures, but the data is not encrypted and may be visible to others

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication verificationVSAvoiddata visibility to unauthorized parties
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges JWS and JWE mechanisms into a hybrid approach. The token structure combines digital signature verification (from JWS) with selective field encryption (from JWE), allowing both authentication verification and data confidentiality to coexist in a single token format.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a composite security structure by layering encryption over the signed token. The underlying JWS provides authentication integrity, while the added encryption layer protects sensitive data from unauthorized viewing, creating a multi-layered security composite.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

3Reliability

If JWE is used to encrypt sensitive data, then security is improved, but key management becomes complex when the same token is consumed by various backend systems

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveencryption securityVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a content encryption key (CEK) as an intermediary that mediates between the symmetric encryption requirement and asymmetric key distribution. The CEK is encrypted with each backend system's public key, allowing multiple systems to decrypt the same encrypted data without directly sharing private keys, thus simplifying key management while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent adds a dimensional layer to key management by introducing a separate content encryption key that is distinct from the authentication signing keys. This additional dimension allows the system to use symmetric encryption for data protection while managing keys through asymmetric cryptography, separating the concerns of authentication and confidentiality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

4Reliability

If asymmetric encryption is used with multiple backend systems, then security is improved, but the same token needs to be encrypted with multiple public keys which is impractical

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity for multi-system consumptionVSAvoidtoken encryption process
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The patent uses a content encryption key as an intermediary that eliminates the need to encrypt the same token multiple times with different public keys. The single CEK encrypts the sensitive data once, and each backend system receives the same encrypted payload, which they can independently decrypt using their respective private keys after the gateway decrypts it with the appropriate key.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

Instead of encrypting the token separately for each backend system with different public keys, the patent inverts the approach by using a single symmetric key to encrypt the data once, then managing access to that encrypted data through asymmetric key pairs at the decryption stage rather than the encryption stage.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Data Source

PatentUS20260039470A1Method and apparatus for secure token generation
Publication Date: 2026.02.05 COMCAST CABLE COMM LLC
  • US20260039470A1 patent drawing
  • US20260039470A1 patent drawing
  • US20260039470A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods and apparatuses are described herein for improved communications between a service and end devices via a gateway. A token may be in a signed encrypted state when sent to untrusted devices and may be signed, but not encrypted, when used by trusted devices. Untrusted devices may receive the encrypted token and may use it to access services. An untrusted device may send the received encrypted token to the gateway, which may then send the token to its issuer so that the token issuer may decrypt the data payload. The token may then be sent back to the gateway, which may then read the decrypted data and verify whether the untrusted device is permitted to access the requested service. The gateway may then send, within the trusted domain, the request and token to the service provider so that the untrusted device can obtain access to the requested service.