Secure Trace Data Filtering and One-Way Transmission

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing systems face challenges in securely transmitting trace information from a high-security zone to an analysis tool in a lower-security zone while ensuring compliance with different security policies, particularly in protecting sensitive information and maintaining data integrity.

Innovation Solution

A secure application generates filtered trace information within a first security zone, using a filter to remove sensitive data, which is then stored in a filtered datastore and accessed by an adapter application to send it to a second security zone for analysis, ensuring one-way communication that adheres to both security policies.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If trace information is transmitted from the first security zone to the second security zone for analysis, then diagnostic capability is improved, but security of sensitive information deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvediagnostic capabilityVSAvoidsecurity risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The filter extracts and removes sensitive information from trace data before transmission. The filter component identifies and strips out sensitive fields such as personally identifiable information, credentials, and security-critical data, allowing only non-sensitive trace information to be transmitted to the second security zone for analysis.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The adapter application serves as an intermediary between the first and second security zones. It receives trace information from the secure application, coordinates with the filter to remove sensitive data, and then transmits the filtered information to the second security zone, thereby mediating the security risk while enabling diagnostics.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If filtering is applied to remove sensitive information from traces, then security is improved, but information completeness for debugging deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidtrace information completeness
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The filter applies selective processing to different parts of the trace information. Instead of removing all information or using a blanket approach, the filter identifies specific sensitive fields and removes only those portions while preserving the rest of the trace data, thereby maintaining local quality where sensitivity requires removal and diagnostic value requires preservation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Reliability

If one-way communication is implemented between security zones, then security policy compliance is improved, but communication flexibility deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity policy complianceVSAvoidcommunication flexibility
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of allowing the analysis tool to pull trace data directly from the secure application (which would violate security policies), the system inverts the communication direction by having the adapter proactively push filtered trace information to the second security zone. This one-way push model maintains security policy compliance while enabling the necessary data flow for diagnostics.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Data Source

PatentUS11113385B2Communicating trace information between security zones
Publication Date: 2021.09.07 PAYPAL INC
  • US11113385B2 patent drawing
  • US11113385B2 patent drawing
  • US11113385B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An application runs in a first security zone of a computer system. Trace information generated from running the application is stored in a first security zone. Filtered trace information is generated by removing specified information from the trace information. The filtered trace information is stored in a particular storage location within the first security zone. An adapter application that is running within the first security zone is executable to access the particular storage location and call a second security zone. The adapter application transmits, from the first security zone to a datastore within the second security zone, the filtered trace information stored in the particular storage location. Communication between the first security zone and the second security zone is one-way from the first security zone to the second security zone.