Secure Trace Messaging Using Timestamp-Based Nonce Encryption
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional debugging and tracing tools transmit trace data unencrypted, making it vulnerable to interception and misuse for reverse engineering or malicious purposes.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure trace data architecture that uses a nonce value for encryption, leveraging time stamps and additional data fields, and symmetric encryption algorithms like AES-GCM or ChaCha-Poly to encrypt trace data instances.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If trace data is transmitted unencrypted for debugging and tracing operations, then ease of operation and compatibility with existing tools is improved, but security and protection against interception is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by encrypting trace data before transmission occurs. The encryption process prepares the data in advance using cryptographic algorithms and keys, so that when the data is transmitted for debugging and tracing operations, it is already protected. This resolves the contradiction by maintaining ease of operation (the debugging tools can still function) while preventing interception vulnerability (the data is encrypted before leaving the system).
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces encryption as an intermediary layer between the trace data generation and transmission processes. This intermediary cryptographic transformation allows the data to maintain its functional properties for debugging purposes while adding security protection during transmission. The encryption acts as a mediator that preserves operational compatibility while eliminating security vulnerabilities.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If encryption is implemented on trace data to prevent interception, then security is improved, but device complexity and processing overhead is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies parameter changes by utilizing hardware-supported cryptographic operations that optimize the encryption process. By changing the implementation parameters from software-based encryption to hardware-accelerated encryption, the system achieves strong security protection while minimizing the added complexity. The hardware support reduces processing overhead and makes the encryption complexity manageable.
3Reliability
If symmetric encryption with authentication is used to secure trace data, then reliability and data integrity is improved, but processing time and computational resources is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by performing encryption and authentication operations before trace data transmission. The cryptographic processing including symmetric encryption and authentication tag generation is completed in advance, ensuring data integrity and reliability before the data leaves the system. This preliminary processing prevents security issues rather than correcting them later, achieving reliable data integrity without excessive processing time during actual transmission.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent utilizes hardware-supported cryptographic operations to change the implementation parameters of encryption and authentication. This hardware acceleration significantly reduces the processing time required for symmetric encryption and authentication operations, while maintaining strong data integrity guarantees. The parameter change from software to hardware implementation resolves the contradiction between reliability and processing time.
Data Source
AI summary
The described techniques address issues associated with current implementations of debugging and tracing tools, which transmit trace data from tracing processes in an unencrypted form. The techniques include providing a secure means by which to convey the trace data instances outside of a monitored system utilizing an encryption scheme that leverages a number used only once (nonce) value for the encryption of the trace data instances. Advantageously, a time stamp value identified with one or more of the trace messages may be used to generate the nonce value to facilitate the encryption of the trace data instances.