Secure Training Sequence Symbol Structure for UWB Spoofing Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing ultra-wideband (UWB) wireless communication systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks due to the use of repetitive pseudo-random sequences in preambles, which can be detected by malicious actors to mimic legitimate transmissions, compromising channel estimation and security.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure training sequence (STS) generated by a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG), which includes multiple segments separated by guard intervals, using binary pulse modulation (BPM) and binary phase shift keying (BPSK), and ensuring only the communicating devices have knowledge of the cryptographic keys to prevent repetition and spoofing.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If repetitive pseudo-random sequences are used in preambles for channel estimation and synchronization, then the receiver can easily detect and locate the start of wireless packets, but malicious actors can detect these sequences and perform spoofing attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The training sequence is divided into multiple segments (first training sequence, second training sequence, third training sequence) with guard intervals between them. Each segment can be independently processed for channel estimation, and the segmentation prevents a single spoofed sequence from compromising the entire training process
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses periodic repetition of training sequence segments separated by guard intervals. This periodic structure allows the receiver to perform multiple channel estimations and average them, improving accuracy while the guard intervals prevent continuous spoofing attempts from overwhelming the system
2Measurement precision
If known pseudo-random sequences are used for training, then channel estimation can be performed accurately, but the sequences become vulnerable to sniffing and replication by attackers
Solution Approach 1:
The patent generates training sequences using a pseudo-random number generator seeded with a predetermined seed value before transmission. This preliminary generation ensures that both transmitter and receiver have the same known sequence for accurate correlation-based channel estimation, while the predetermined seed provides reproducibility without exposing the full sequence to attackers
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameters of the training sequences by using different seed values for different segments and employing guard intervals with specific time durations. These parameter variations make it difficult for attackers to replicate the sequences while maintaining the pseudo-random properties needed for accurate channel estimation
3Reliability
If guard intervals are inserted between training sequence segments, then channel estimation robustness is improved, but transmission time and bandwidth utilization increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses guard intervals that are sufficient to separate multipath components and prevent inter-segment interference, but not excessively long. The guard interval duration is carefully chosen to provide the necessary robustness for channel estimation while minimizing the time overhead and maintaining efficient bandwidth utilization
Data Source
AI summary
A secure training sequence (STS) is included in wireless packets communicated between electronic devices to assist with channel estimation and wireless ranging. The STS includes multiple STS segments generated based on outputs from a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG), the STS segments being separated by guard intervals and formatted in accordance with an 802.15.4 data symbol format that uses burst position modulation (BPM) and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) to map bits from the CSPRNG to burst positions and pulse polarities for the STS symbols. Both a first electronic device, which generates the STS, and a second electronic device, which estimates a communication channel using the STS, have prior private knowledge of cryptographic keys required to generate a non-repetitive single-use pseudo-random (PR) sequence by the CSPRNG. The STS includes two burst position intervals per STS symbol and two possible burst positions within each burst position interval.