Secure UWB Ranging With Interference and Spoofing Detection
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Ultrawideband (UWB) devices face challenges in maintaining accurate ranging and security due to susceptibility to over-the-air attacks and interference, which degrade the integrity of time-of-arrival estimates, especially in obstructed line of sight conditions.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure ranging method using scrambled timestamp sequences and secure sequences through out-of-band communications, such as WiFi or Bluetooth, to enhance the integrity of time-of-arrival estimates by correlating received data packets with encrypted sequences, and employing integrity checks like peak-to-sidelobe ratio and statistical analysis.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional UWB ranging protocols are used, then ranging functionality is provided, but the system is susceptible to over-the-air attacks and interference that falsify time-of-arrival estimates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-sharing secret sequences and scrambled timestamp sequences between communicating devices before the actual ranging measurement. This preliminary key exchange enables the devices to later verify the authenticity of ranging signals, preventing spoofing attacks by ensuring only authorized devices can generate valid time-of-arrival estimates.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback mechanisms where receiving devices correlate incoming ranging signals with pre-shared secret sequences and provide integrity verification feedback. This feedback loop allows the system to detect and reject spoofed signals by comparing received sequences against expected sequences, thereby maintaining reliability of time-of-arrival estimates.
2Measurement precision
If UWB devices perform ranging in obstructed line of sight conditions, then ranging capability is maintained, but range accuracy degrades
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces secret sequences and scrambled timestamp sequences as intermediary verification elements that mediate between the transmitted ranging signal and the received measurement. These intermediaries enable the system to verify signal authenticity even when direct line-of-sight is obstructed, allowing the device to distinguish between legitimate reflected signals and spoofed signals.
3Reliability
If secure sequences and scrambled timestamp sequences are implemented, then integrity of time-of-arrival estimates is enhanced, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies copying by having devices store and replicate secret sequences and scrambled timestamp sequences in advance. Instead of implementing complex real-time verification algorithms, devices simply copy pre-shared sequences and use them for correlation-based verification, significantly reducing computational complexity while maintaining security and integrity.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
Enhances the security and accuracy of UWB ranging by detecting spoofed signals and channel interference, ensuring the integrity of time-of-arrival estimates and improving the overall reliability of UWB positioning.
Implementation Method 1
computing a time of arrival estimate based on a correlation of the one or more received responder data packets with the scrambled timestamp sequence information and the secure sequence
Data Source
AI summary
Techniques are provided for performing ranging operations with ultrawideband (UWB) devices in a network. An example method includes providing scrambled timestamp sequence information and a secure sequence to a wireless node via a first radio access technology, transmitting one or more initiator data packets to the wireless node via a second radio access technology based at least in part on the scrambled timestamp sequence information, receiving one or more responder data packets from the wireless node via the second radio access technology, computing a time of arrival estimate based on a correlation of the one or more received responder data packets with the scrambled timestamp sequence information and the secure sequence, and determining the integrity of the time of arrival estimate based at least in part on the correlation of the one or more received responder data packets with the scrambled timestamp sequence information and the secure sequence.


