Secured Disk Image Upgrade for Virtual Hosts
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for upgrading locked down virtual hosts lack effective tamper-proofing and validation of software packages, particularly for non-bootable disk images, which can be compromised during transmission, leading to potential tampering and integrity issues.
Innovation Solution
The creation of a secured disk image using encryption and checksums, where a manifest file and install binary are encrypted with a private key, and validated using a public key derived from a certificate, ensuring the integrity of files before execution.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If a non-bootable disk image is used for upgrading locked down virtual hosts, then the upgrade process can be simplified and automated, but the disk image becomes vulnerable to tampering and integrity compromises during transmission
Solution Approach 1:
The manifest file and install binary are encrypted with a private key before being packaged into the disk image. This preliminary encryption action ensures that the critical software components are protected from tampering during transmission and deployment, while still allowing automated installation through the locked down virtual host interface
Solution Approach 2:
A certificate containing a public key is introduced as an intermediary component. The public key derived from this certificate enables the locked down virtual host to validate the encryption and ensure disk image integrity without requiring command-line shell access, thus maintaining both automation and security
2Reliability
If encryption is applied to the manifest file and install binary, then tamper-proofing is enhanced, but the complexity of the upgrade process increases
Solution Approach 1:
The locked down virtual host automatically performs the decryption and validation operations using the public key from the certificate. The encryption scheme is designed to be self-validating, where the manifest file contains checksums that automatically verify file integrity without requiring manual intervention or complex validation logic
Solution Approach 2:
The solution changes the cryptographic parameters from simple checksums to public-key encryption with certificate-based validation. This parameter change enhances security while the automated processing keeps the operational complexity manageable within the locked down environment
3Measurement precision
If checksum validation is performed on all files, then integrity verification is improved, but the processing time and computational resources increase
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of validating all files equally, the solution focuses validation efforts on the critical manifest file and install binary through encryption. The manifest file serves as a partial validation mechanism that, when decrypted and verified, provides sufficient assurance of overall disk image integrity without requiring exhaustive validation of every single file
Data Source
AI summary
An apparatus comprises at least one processing device coupled to memory. The at least one processing device is configured to obtain a secured disk image comprising an encrypted manifest file, an encrypted install binary and a plurality of other files. The at least one processing device is further configured to obtain a certificate corresponding to the secured disk image and to derive a public key based at least in part on the certificate. The at least one processing device is further configured to decrypt the manifest file and the install binary based at least in part on the public key and to validate checksums for respective ones of the plurality of other files against corresponding checksums contained in the decrypted manifest file. The at least one processing device is further configured to execute the decrypted install binary responsive to validation of the checksums for the respective ones of the plurality of other files.