Security Architecture for Mobile Payment Applications
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Solution Overview
Problem
Mobile devices without secure elements face challenges in securely storing and managing cryptographic keys for contactless payments, especially when operating in offline modes, as existing solutions are not effective in defending against rooting attacks and ensuring secure transaction processes.
Innovation Solution
A security architecture that utilizes non-volatile storage for cryptographic keys and volatile storage for one-time use encrypted integers, with the latter being replenished externally and lost on reboot, allowing for secure transaction processing and defense against rooting attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Duration of action of moving object
If cryptographic keys are stored in non-volatile storage for persistent access, then key availability is improved, but security against rooting attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic material is segmented into two distinct types: first cryptographic material stored in non-volatile storage for persistent use, and second cryptographic material stored in volatile storage for temporary use. This segmentation allows each type to serve different security functions - the first provides long-term key availability while the second provides short-term security against rooting attacks by being erased on reboot.
Solution Approach 2:
The second cryptographic material in volatile storage acts as an intermediary security layer between the persistent first cryptographic material and the external threat environment. This intermediate volatile storage provides a buffer that enhances security without compromising the availability of the primary cryptographic keys stored in non-volatile storage.
2Reliability
If volatile storage is used for one-time cryptographic material, then security against rooting attacks is improved, but key persistence deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The second cryptographic material is implemented as a disposable, short-living cryptographic element stored in volatile storage. This material is used for a single transaction or limited purpose and then discarded when the device reboots, providing inexpensive security enhancement without requiring long-term persistence. The low cost of regenerating this material makes it ideal for single-use security purposes.
3Adaptability or versatility
If cryptographic keys are stored outside secure elements, then device compatibility is improved, but security management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The security architecture uses universal storage components (non-volatile and volatile memory) that are available in all mobile devices, eliminating the need for specialized secure elements. This multi-functional approach allows the same storage infrastructure to serve both general-purpose data storage and cryptographic key storage, improving device compatibility while maintaining security through proper cryptographic practices.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2~3A
Figure 3B~3C
AI summary
A computing device embodies a security architecture for an application (42). The security architecture has non-volatile storage (43) for storing first cryptographic material and volatile storage (51) for storing second cryptographic material. The second cryptographic material is lost on rebooting of the computing device. At least the second cryptographic material may be replenished from a source external to the computing device but accessible by a computing network. Methods of use of this architecture by the application are also described.