Security Component Audit Memory for Information Leakage Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing security equipment for partitioning data transfers between domains is vulnerable to bypass attempts during cyber attacks, particularly when the security component is subjected to varying read speeds by the receiver domain, leading to potential information leakage from a high-security domain to a low-security domain.
Innovation Solution
Incorporating a security component with a means to generate operating metadata and write it to a shared audit memory, along with an audit component that processes this metadata, ensuring segregated execution to monitor the security component's operation independently of its load and behavior, thereby implementing strategies for online or offline monitoring.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the receiver domain reads data packets from the output storage space at varying speeds to generate information messages, then the security component is forced to destroy packets when output storage is full, but this creates potential information leakage from high-security to low-security domain
Solution Approach 1:
An audit component is introduced as an intermediary between the security component and the receiver domain. This audit component monitors the filling state of the output storage space and generates audit messages that reveal no information about the security component's internal state. The audit component acts as a mediator that allows the receiver to observe system operation while preventing information leakage about the high-security domain's storage state.
Solution Approach 2:
The security component's operation is monitored with feedback mechanisms that track the filling state of storage spaces. However, this feedback is processed through the audit component which transforms it into safe audit messages. The feedback loop ensures the security component operates correctly while the audit component ensures no sensitive information about storage states leaks to the low-security domain.
2Measurement precision
If the security component monitors its own operation to detect bypass attempts, then the ability to detect abnormal behavior improves, but the complexity of the security component increases
Solution Approach 1:
The monitoring functionality is segmented from the security component and placed in a separate audit component. This segmentation allows the security component to focus on its core security functions while the audit component handles monitoring and detection tasks. The separation reduces the complexity of the security component while maintaining or improving detection precision through dedicated monitoring capabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The audit component serves as an intermediary that performs the complex monitoring and analysis functions. Instead of embedding complex detection logic within the security component, the audit component acts as a separate entity that observes security component operation and detects bypass attempts, thereby reducing security component complexity while enhancing detection capabilities.
3Reliability
If the security component writes detailed operation metadata to audit memory, then the ability to monitor operation independently improves, but the amount of data to be processed increases
Solution Approach 1:
The audit component processes metadata with selective attention to relevant information. Instead of processing all metadata uniformly, the audit component focuses on specific aspects of the metadata that are critical for detecting bypass attempts while ignoring less relevant information. This selective processing reduces the effective data volume while maintaining monitoring independence and reliability.
Solution Approach 2:
The system writes comprehensive metadata to ensure complete monitoring capability, but the audit component processes only the necessary portion of this metadata. This partial processing approach allows the system to maintain full monitoring independence while reducing the actual processing burden. The excessive metadata writing ensures no information is lost, while selective processing manages the data volume.
Data Source
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AI summary
This equipment (10) comprises: a hardware layer (20), including a processor, a hardware memory compartmentalization mechanism, and a storage means; a virtualization layer (30), including a kernel and a hypervisor; and an application layer (40) comprising: first and second interface components (41, 42) for exchanging data with the first and second domains; and a security component (44) forming a data exchange gateway between the first and second components. It is characterized in that the security component (44) includes a means (47) for generating metadata and a means (48) for writing this metadata to a shared audit memory (50), and in that the application layer (40) includes an audit component (46), including a means (52) for reading metadata from the shared memory and a means (54) for processing the read metadata.