Security Barrier Sensor Nesting for Intrusion Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing security systems fail to effectively detect illicit attempts to compromise or penetrate physical barriers, especially when only simple continuity sensors are allowed due to operational concerns or sensitivity of the protected device.

Innovation Solution

A barrier system featuring a hasp attached to a base member with a through passage, where a sensor is woven through the hasp and outer layer, configured to deform or sever when the outer member is separated from the base member, triggering a change in the sensed condition.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a simple continuity sensor is used in the security barrier area, then the operational concerns and sensitivity requirements are met, but the detection capability for illicit attempts is insufficient

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoidsensor complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The sensor is nested within the barrier structure itself, specifically passing through the hasp and outer layer, making it invisible and inaccessible without destroying the barrier. This nesting approach allows a sophisticated detection capability to be embedded within a simple-looking barrier, resolving the contradiction between detection reliability and device complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #7Nested doll (Nesting)

Solution Approach 2:

The hasp acts as an intermediary mechanical element that translates various illicit access attempts (prying, cutting, drilling) into sensor-deforming forces. This intermediary mechanism allows a simple continuity sensor to detect complex intrusion attempts, improving detection capability without requiring complex sensor technology.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If the sensor is made accessible or observable for monitoring purposes, then the detection capability improves, but the covert protection and security are compromised

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoidvulnerability to tampering
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The sensor is nested deep within the barrier structure, passing through the hasp and outer layer, making it physically inaccessible without destroying the barrier. This nesting provides both covert protection and ensures that any attempt to access the sensor itself constitutes an intrusion event, simultaneously achieving reliability and security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #7Nested doll (Nesting)

Solution Approach 2:

The barrier structure itself serves as the protective casing for the sensor, eliminating the need for separate protective housings or accessible monitoring points. The barrier's own structure provides the covert protection, while the sensor's embedded position ensures that tampering with the sensor equals tampering with the barrier.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Ease of operation

If the hasp is designed to be easily removable for legitimate access, then the ease of operation improves, but the detection of illicit separation becomes more difficult

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveaccessibilityVSAvoidintrusion detection
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The sensor acts as an intermediary detection element that is stretched across the hasp separation path. During legitimate removal, the hasp and outer layer move together without deforming the sensor. During illicit attempts, the sensor is deformed or severed, providing reliable intrusion detection while maintaining ease of legitimate operation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system monitors changes in the sensor's physical state (integrity, position, tension) to distinguish between legitimate and illicit separation. Legitimate removal maintains sensor integrity, while illicit attempts cause detectable parameter changes such as deformation or severing, enabling reliable intrusion detection alongside easy operation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS10068443B1Security barriers, systems and methods
Publication Date: 2018.09.04 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS OF SANDIA LLC
  • US10068443B1 patent drawing
  • US10068443B1 patent drawing
  • US10068443B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems, arrangements, barriers and methods for detecting illicit attempts to compromise or penetrate a physical barrier are disclosed. The systems, arrangements, barriers and methods detect illicit attempts to pry, remove or compromise a security barrier from the surface or location it protects, by insider/outsider adversaries, when any type of cabled continuity sensor (optical, electrical) is woven, embedded, or interlaced through the security barrier.