Security Device Microstructure Key Generation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing security measures for cryptographic keys, such as tamper-proof chips, are not foolproof and can be compromised by malicious users, allowing unauthorized access to secret keys.

Innovation Solution

A security device with a covering device that provides a unique random output signal based on its microstructure, surrounding key generation and digital signature components to prevent unauthorized access, and includes a protective layer to maintain the microstructure integrity, even under normal use or attachment to objects.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a secret key is stored in a tamper-proof chip, then the security of the cryptographic key is improved, but the chip can still be compromised by malicious users using probes to read the key

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of cryptographic keyVSAvoidunauthorized access to secret key
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent converts the harmful effect of physical access attempts into a beneficial security mechanism. When a malicious user attempts to probe or access the secret key storage, the system detects the intrusion and deliberately destroys the secret key, transforming the harmful access attempt into a security enhancement that prevents key compromise.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary destruction of the secret key in anticipation of unauthorized access. Before a malicious user can successfully read the key, the system proactively destroys it upon detecting any access attempt, ensuring the key is never exposed to unauthorized parties.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If the secret key is destroyed upon access attempt, then unauthorized determination of the key is prevented, but the security device must detect and respond to access attempts in real-time

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprevention of key compromiseVSAvoiddetection and response mechanism
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The security device performs self-protection by automatically detecting access attempts and destroying the secret key without requiring external intervention. The system monitors its own state and autonomously responds to intrusion attempts, eliminating the need for complex external detection and response systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The system uses the act of unauthorized access itself as the trigger for key destruction. The harmful probe or access attempt directly causes the beneficial security response, simplifying the detection mechanism to merely monitor for the presence of unauthorized access rather than requiring complex intrusion detection systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

The solution effectively prevents unauthorized determination of secret keys by altering the microstructure upon attempted access, ensuring the secrecy and authenticity of cryptographic signatures, enhancing security beyond traditional tamper-proof solutions.

Implementation Method 1

a covering device that, in response to an input signal, consistently provides a same random output signal that varies according to the microstructure of the covering device, where altering the microstructure of the covering device alters the random output signal

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectMicrostructure-based random signal generation:

Implementation Method 2

a protective layer disposed on one or more outer surfaces of the security device to prevent the microstructure of the covering device from being altered under normal use of the security device

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectPhysical protection: Physical Containment

Data Source

PatentUS11741332B2Securing cryptographic keys
Publication Date: 2023.08.29 MICALI SILVIO
  • US11741332B2 patent drawing
  • US11741332B2 patent drawing
  • US11741332B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A security device includes a covering device that, in response to an input signal, consistently provides a same random output signal that varies according to the microstructure of the covering device, where altering the microstructure of the covering device alters the random output signal, a key generation component that generates a secret key based on the random output signal, and a digital signature component that produces a digital signature of a message received by the security device using the secret key. The covering device surrounds at least a portion of the key generation component and the digital signature component to prevent access thereto and where accessing any of the components alters the microstructure of the covering device to alter the random output signal. The security device may be attached to an object and detaching the security device from the object may alter the microstructure of the covering device.