Self-Encrypting Drive Crypto-Erasure via Key Segmentation
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Data centers face challenges in definitively crypto-erasing failed or decommissioned self-encrypting drives (SEDs), as they cannot always receive or respond to crypto-erase commands, leading to concerns about forensic recovery and the need for physical destruction to ensure data security.
Innovation Solution
A method where the Media Encryption Key (MEK) is split into two parts, with one key share stored internally on the SED and the other externally, allowing for crypto-erasure by both internal and external actions, ensuring secure deletion regardless of the drive's operational state.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the MEK is stored internally on the SED, then data encryption is enabled, but crypto-erasure cannot be definitively performed if the drive fails
Solution Approach 1:
The MEK is segmented into two separate key shares: Key1 stored internally on the SED and Key2 stored externally. Both key shares are required to decrypt data, enabling definitive crypto-erasure by destroying either key share while maintaining data accessibility during normal operation.
2Reliability
If the MEK is stored externally, then crypto-erasure can be performed by destroying the key, but the key becomes vulnerable to capture or retrieval
Solution Approach 1:
The MEK is divided into Key1 (stored on SED) and Key2 (stored externally). This segmentation ensures that external key storage enables crypto-erasure while the internal Key1 protects against key capture, as both keys are required for decryption.
Solution Approach 2:
The SED acts as an intermediary that combines Key1 and Key2 to generate the functional MEK only when needed for decryption. This mediator approach allows external key management while maintaining security through the internal key's protection.
3Ease of operation
If multiple copies of the key are made for availability, then data accessibility is improved, but key management becomes significantly more difficult to secure
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of distributing multiple copies of the complete MEK, the system segments the key into Key1 and Key2. Data accessibility is maintained through the combination of these segments, while key management complexity is reduced because securing two key shares is simpler than managing multiple complete key copies.
Data Source
AI summary
Device-implemented methodology for enabling and/or performing crypto-erase via internal action and external action. In one illustrative aspect, a request to read data is received at a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. In one approach, a first key stored within the device is accessed. In another approach, a first key stored on and/or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The encrypted form of the data is read from the storage medium. The encrypted form of the data is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output. Methodology for writing encrypted data is also presented.