SEED Encryption Masking for Power Analysis Defense
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing masking techniques for defending against differential power analysis attacks are not applicable to the SEED encryption algorithm due to its distinct structure, particularly in low memory and low-speed operation environments like smart cards, where they fail to improve operation speed and memory efficiency.
Innovation Solution
A masking method is developed that generates inverse and conversion tables as look-up tables, uses mask values to create a masking inverse table, and applies these to the SEED encryption algorithm to efficiently mask S-box operations, reducing computation cost and RAM usage by masking only one look-up table for S-box operations, and optimizing the masking addition operation.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing masking techniques for AES are applied to SEED encryption, then security against differential power analysis attacks is improved, but the technique cannot be applied due to structural differences in SEED
Solution Approach 1:
The patent modifies the masking approach by changing the parameters of the look-up tables used in SEED encryption. Specifically, it applies masking to the inverse table and conversion tables that are fundamental to SEED's structure, rather than applying AES-based masking techniques. This parameter change allows the masking to be adapted to SEED's specific mathematical structure while maintaining security against differential power analysis attacks.
2Reliability
If masking operations are performed on all look-up tables in SEED encryption, then security is improved, but operation speed and memory efficiency deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts and applies masking only to the critical look-up tables (inverse table and conversion tables) that are essential for SEED encryption security, rather than masking all tables. This selective extraction approach maintains security against differential power analysis while minimizing the impact on operation speed and memory efficiency by limiting the scope of masking operations to only the necessary components.
3Reliability
If masking operations are performed on all look-up tables in SEED encryption, then security is improved, but memory usage increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts and applies masking only to the critical look-up tables (inverse table and conversion tables) that are essential for SEED encryption security, rather than masking all tables. This selective extraction approach maintains security against differential power analysis while minimizing the impact on operation speed and memory efficiency by limiting the scope of masking operations to only the necessary components.
4Reliability
If complex masking operations are implemented in SEED encryption, then security against differential power analysis attacks is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent modifies the masking approach by changing the parameters of the look-up tables used in SEED encryption. Specifically, it applies masking to the inverse table and conversion tables that are fundamental to SEED's structure, rather than applying AES-based masking techniques. This parameter change allows the masking to be adapted to SEED's specific mathematical structure while maintaining security against differential power analysis attacks.
Data Source
AI summary
A plurality of S-boxes is masked by one masking inverse table. Therefore, the computation cost and the use amount of the RAM necessary for masking at the time of a masking operation for defending a differential power analysis attack in a SEED encryption algorithm can be effectively reduced.