Secure Seed Splitting and HSM Signing for Crypto Key Backup
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current wallet and key management systems for cryptocurrencies face security threats due to the creation of private keys in non-tamper-proof environments, making them vulnerable to theft and loss, and existing backup methods are susceptible to attacks, compromising the security of cryptographic funds.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure firmware transaction signing platform that utilizes FIPS 140-2 certified hardware security modules (HSMs) to securely derive and manage cryptographic keys, split master seeds into multiple shares, and enforce M-of-N authentication policies to protect against unauthorized access and theft.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If private keys are created in non-tamper-proof environments, then key generation is simple and accessible, but security is compromised making keys vulnerable to theft and loss
Solution Approach 1:
The master seed is segmented into multiple shares using secret sharing schemes, distributing security across multiple components rather than concentrating it in a single location. This allows simple key generation while maintaining security through distributed storage and M-of-N authentication requirements.
Solution Approach 2:
A hardware security module (HSM) certified to FIPS 140-2 acts as an intermediary between key generation and storage. The HSM provides a tamper-proof environment that simplifies the overall system by handling secure key operations internally, eliminating the need for complex software-based security implementations.
2Ease of operation
If master seeds are stored in a single location, then backup and recovery are simple, but security is compromised making them susceptible to attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The master seed is divided into multiple shares that are stored in different locations. Recovery requires assembling a threshold number of shares (M-of-N), which maintains operational simplicity through standardized procedures while protecting against attacks by distributing security across multiple physical locations.
Solution Approach 2:
Multiple layers of security are nested within the backup system: the master seed is nested within share structures, which are nested within distributed storage locations, and access is nested within M-of-N authentication requirements. This creates a nested security model that maintains simplicity at each layer while providing comprehensive protection.
3Productivity
If traditional backup methods are used, then backup processes are simple and fast, but security is compromised making backups susceptible to attacks
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of backing up a single master seed, the system segments the seed into multiple shares and distributes them. This segmentation allows parallel backup operations that maintain speed while improving security through distribution, as attacks must compromise multiple distributed shares rather than a single centralized backup.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces software-based backup mechanisms with hardware security modules (HSMs) certified to FIPS 140-2. This substitution provides tamper-proof security while maintaining backup efficiency through standardized hardware interfaces and automated share distribution processes.
Data Source
AI summary
The Address Verification, Seed Splitting and Firmware Extension for Secure Cryptocurrency Key Backup, Restore, and Transaction Signing Platform Apparatuses, Methods and Systems (“SFTSP”) transforms contract deployment request, transaction signing request, key backup request, key recovery request inputs via SFTSP components into contract deployment response, transaction signing response, key backup response, key recovery response outputs. A transaction signing request message datastructure associated with a transaction is obtained. Owner key identification parameters associated with an owner datastructure associated with a verified address wallet datastructure are determined. A contract address for the verified address wallet datastructure is calculated as a function of a deployment factory address, a salt value for the smart contract, contract code for the smart contract, and an owner address generated using the owner key identification parameters. A contract deployment signature is validated. A transaction hash for the transaction is calculated and a transaction signature is generated and returned.