Sensor Fusion Error Analysis for MEMS Attack Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing countermeasures for detecting attacks on MEMS sensors, such as shielding or replacing sensor parts, are costly and can affect other sensors, while software-based methods lack versatility and require specific sensor settings.

Innovation Solution

An attack detection device that uses a correlation calculation unit and an attack determination unit to detect inconsistencies in sensor data by analyzing correlations and sensor fusion errors, allowing for real-time detection of attacks without modifying the sensor itself.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If hardware countermeasures such as shielding or replacing sensor parts are used, then attack detection capability is improved, but cost increases and other sensors may be adversely affected

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveattack detection capabilityVSAvoidcost and sensor operation

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSEase of manufacture

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a signal processing unit as an intermediary between the sensor and the control system. This unit analyzes sensor signals for anomalies (such as resonance patterns indicating ultrasonic attacks) without requiring physical modification of the sensor itself, thus detecting attacks while avoiding the costs and side effects of hardware countermeasures

Inventive Principle:

Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces mechanical/physical countermeasures (shielding, replacing sensor parts) with a software-based signal analysis approach. By substituting physical modifications with computational analysis of sensor outputs, the system achieves attack detection without increasing manufacturing complexity or affecting other sensors

Inventive Principle:

Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

2Reliability

If software-based countermeasures with specific sensor settings are used, then attack detection capability is improved, but versatility decreases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveattack detection capabilityVSAvoidsensor compatibility

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The signal processing unit is designed with universal functionality that can detect various types of sensor attacks across different sensor types. It analyzes general anomaly patterns in sensor signals without requiring sensor-specific configurations, making the attack detection capability applicable to multiple sensor types including acceleration sensors, gyro sensors, and magnetic sensors

Inventive Principle:

Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentEP3767246B1Attack detection device, attack detection program, and attack detection method

Publication Date: 2022.08.10 MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC CORP

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AI summary

A correlation calculation unit (21) receives magnetic data and acceleration data, which are sensor data, from a sensor fusion unit (12a), and calculates a correlation value. An attack determination unit (22) acquires the correlation value from the correlation calculation unit (21), and acquires, as error data, a gravity vector error and a geomagnetic vector error that are calculated in the process of sensor fusion from the sensor fusion unit (12). The attack determination unit (22) determines the presence or absence of an attack on an inclination sensor module (1a) by comparing the correlation value with a threshold value corresponding to the correlation value and comparing the error data with a threshold value corresponding to the error data.