SEPP Roaming Attack Mitigation via UE Behavior Pattern Matching
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Solution Overview
Problem
5G telecommunications networks face fraud and denial of service attacks through roaming inter-PLMN signaling, particularly affecting IoT devices, as existing standards do not specify analysis of expected user equipment (UE) behavior patterns for security mitigation.
Innovation Solution
A method and system that utilize a network function, such as a security edge protection proxy (SEPP), to receive service request messages for IoT devices, obtain and compare parameters indicating expected UE behavior patterns from the home public land mobile network (PLMN), and reject or drop requests that do not match these patterns, thereby mitigating fraudulent roaming attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the SEPP performs message filtering and policing for all API messages transmitted between PLMNs, then roaming security attacks are mitigated, but the complexity of the system increases and legitimate traffic may be blocked
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by obtaining expected UE behavior parameters (such as stationary indication, communication frequency, communication type) before validating roaming service requests. The home PLMN provisions these parameters in advance, allowing the SEPP to compare incoming requests against pre-established behavioral profiles, thereby identifying fraudulent traffic without complex real-time analysis
Solution Approach 2:
The patent utilizes parameter changes by transforming the validation approach from complex algorithmic analysis to simple parameter comparison. The SEPP compares specific parameters (stationary indication, communication frequency, communication type) from incoming service requests against provisioned expected behavior parameters, using parameter mismatch as the basis for blocking fraudulent requests
2Object-affected harmful factors
If the SEPP blocks all inter-PLMN roaming traffic for IoT devices, then fraudulent attacks are prevented, but legitimate roaming services are also blocked
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by differentiating validation requirements based on device characteristics. The home PLMN provisions expected behavior parameters specific to each UE's nature (e.g., stationary indication for fixed IoT devices like water meters). The SEPP applies localized validation rules matching the specific device type and its authorized roaming behavior, allowing legitimate traffic while blocking fraud
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback by continuously comparing incoming service request parameters against expected behavior parameters and using the comparison results to determine whether to allow or block traffic. The validation process provides feedback on whether the requesting UE's behavior aligns with its authorized profile, enabling dynamic traffic control
3Measurement precision
If complex algorithms are implemented to analyze UE behavior patterns, then detection accuracy improves, but processing time and computational resources increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential behavior parameters (stationary indication, communication frequency, communication type) needed for fraud detection from the complete UE profile. By taking out only these critical parameters for comparison against incoming service requests, the system achieves sufficient detection accuracy without the computational overhead of analyzing complete behavioral patterns or implementing complex algorithms
Data Source
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AI summary
A method for mitigating a 5G roaming attack for an Internet of things (loT) device based on expected user equipment (UE) behavior patterns includes receiving, at a network function (NF) including at least one processor, a service request message requesting a service from a home public land mobile network (PLMN) of a UE identified in the service request message, wherein the UE comprises an loT device and obtaining, for the UE identified in service request message, at least one parameter provisioned in the home PLMN to indicate an expected UE behavior pattern. The method further includes comparing the at least one parameter provisioned in the home PLMN to indicate the expected UE behavior pattern to at least one parameter from the service request message and that the at least one parameter from the service request message is not indicative of the expected UE behavior pattern of the UE. The method further includes dropping or rejecting the service request message.