SEPP Roaming Spoofing Mitigation via TLS Identity Cross-Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
The 5G network architecture is vulnerable to roaming spoofing attacks due to the lack of validation of remote endpoint identities during the N32-c security capability negotiation procedure, allowing malicious entities to impersonate SEPPs and gain unauthorized access to PLMNs.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method where the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) cross-validates identities by comparing Transport Layer Security (TLS) identifiers with N32-c security capability negotiation message identifiers and performs lookups in a peer SEPP database to verify the authenticity of communication nodes, blocking unauthorized access if validation fails.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If identity validation is not performed during N32-c security capability negotiation, then the network architecture remains simple and operations are easy, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks and unauthorized access
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by performing identity validation through TLS certificate verification before the N32-c security capability negotiation begins. The SEPP validates the remote endpoint's TLS certificate to obtain and verify its identity beforehand, ensuring that only authenticated nodes can proceed with the negotiation. This prevents spoofing attacks at the earliest possible stage without complicating the subsequent negotiation steps.
2Reliability
If TLS certificate validation is implemented to verify node identities, then spoofing attacks are mitigated, but the authentication process becomes more complex and time-consuming
Solution Approach 1:
The TLS certificate validation is performed as a preliminary action before the N32-c negotiation begins. By completing the identity verification upfront through TLS handshake and certificate validation, the patent ensures that subsequent negotiation steps can proceed quickly without repeated validation delays. The SEPP extracts and caches the validated identity information for use during the negotiation process.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses the TLS protocol as an intermediary mechanism to perform secure identity validation. Instead of implementing a custom complex validation protocol, the SEPP leverages the well-established TLS certificate verification process to authenticate remote endpoints. This intermediary approach provides reliable authentication while avoiding the need to design and implement a new validation mechanism from scratch.
3Reliability
If the SEPP validates remote endpoint identities through TLS certificates, then unauthorized access is prevented, but the processing overhead and computational requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent delegates the computationally intensive task of certificate validation to the TLS protocol implementation, which is an established and optimized intermediary system. The SEPP leverages the TLS library's efficient certificate verification capabilities rather than implementing its own validation logic. This approach provides strong access control security while minimizing the computational overhead on the SEPP by relying on proven, optimized validation mechanisms.
Data Source
AI summary
Roaming spoofing attacks can be initiated during N32-c handshake procedure used for inter-PLMN communication in 5G network. One example solution described herein uses the SEPP to mitigate the N32-c roaming spoofing attacks by cross validating the sender attribute present in N32-c handshake security capability exchange messages against the endpoint identity in the X.509v3 certificate shared during TLS handshake and the remote SEPP identity configured in the SEPP's local database.