Session Key Exchange for Secure Host-Accelerator Channels

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing systems fail to adequately secure communication channels between host systems and data processing accelerators, such as AI accelerators, leading to potential data leaks and unauthorized access.

Innovation Solution

A method and system are implemented to establish secure channels using session keys generated through cryptographic processes, involving trusted execution environments, trusted platform modules, and secure boot mechanisms to protect data exchanges between host systems and data processing accelerators.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If cryptographic session keys are implemented to secure communication channels, then data confidentiality and integrity are improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata confidentialityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements secure boot mechanisms that pre-establish trusted execution environments and generate cryptographic key pairs before data processing operations begin. The host system and DP accelerator exchange public keys and derive session keys in advance, ensuring security is built into the system foundation rather than added later, thus managing complexity through proactive security architecture

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces trusted platform modules (TPM) and trusted execution environments (TEE) as intermediary security layers between the host system and DP accelerator. These intermediaries handle cryptographic operations, key management, and session key derivation, isolating complex security logic from the main data processing path while ensuring confidential communication channels

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If trusted execution environments and secure boot mechanisms are implemented, then unauthorized access prevention is improved, but processing overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveunauthorized access preventionVSAvoidprocessing overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs secure boot verification, trusted environment establishment, and cryptographic key pair generation during system initialization before any data processing workloads are executed. This preliminary security setup ensures that subsequent AI training and inference operations can proceed without repeated security verification overhead, as the trusted execution environment is already established

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments security functions into dedicated trusted execution environments and isolated cryptographic operation zones within the DP accelerator. By separating security-critical operations (key management, session key derivation) from general-purpose AI computing workloads, the system can maintain high processing throughput for data-intensive tasks while minimizing overhead from security operations

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentEP3811557B1Method and system to derive a session key to secure an information exchange channel between a host system and a data processing accelerator
Publication Date: 2026.02.11 BAIDU COM TIMES TECH (BEIJING) CO LTD
  • EP3811557B1 patent drawingFigure 1
  • EP3811557B1 patent drawingFigure 2
  • EP3811557B1 patent drawingFigure 3

AI summary

According to one embodiment, in response to receiving a temporary public key (PK_d) from a data processing (DP) accelerator, a system generates a first nonce (nc) at the host system, where the DP accelerator is coupled to the host system over a bus. The system transmits a request to create a session key from the host system to the DP accelerator, the request including a host public key (PK_O) and the first nonce. The system receives a second nonce (ns) from the DP accelerator, where the second nonce is encrypted using the host public key and a temporary private key (SK_d) corresponding to the temporary public key. The system generates a first session key based on the first nonce and the second nonce, which is utilized to encrypt or decrypt subsequent data exchanges between the host system and the DP accelerator.