Shadow Model Training Pipeline for ML Reverse Engineering Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Cloud-based machine learning models are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks, where attackers reconstruct a surrogate model by submitting inference requests, compromising the confidentiality and privacy of the original model and its data.

Innovation Solution

A shadow model training pipeline is generated and monitored, with feature vectors from inference requests used to train the shadow model, allowing for comparison with the original model to detect and prevent reverse engineering attacks by filtering or blocking malicious requests.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If cloud-based machine learning models are made accessible over a network, then ease of operation and accessibility are improved, but vulnerability to reverse engineering attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveaccessibilityVSAvoidreverse engineering attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent creates a shadow model that is a copy of the original machine learning model. This shadow model receives the same inference requests as the original model and generates responses that can be compared to detect reverse engineering attacks. The copying principle allows the system to monitor and detect attacks without affecting the original model's accessibility.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The shadow model acts as an intermediary between the original machine learning model and the attacker. By placing the shadow model in the inference path, the system can detect reverse engineering attempts through comparison of responses while maintaining the original model's accessibility to authorized users.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If a shadow model training pipeline is implemented to detect reverse engineering attacks, then security and reliability are improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattack detection capabilityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of implementing complex security measures, the system uses a simplified approach by copying the original model to create a shadow model. This copy is trained in parallel and compares responses to detect attacks, providing reliable security monitoring with relatively simple system architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The shadow model training pipeline uses the same inference requests that would normally go to the original model to train the shadow model. This self-service approach allows the system to monitor for attacks while utilizing existing computational resources and traffic patterns.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Measurement precision

If the original model responses are compared with shadow model responses to detect attacks, then measurement precision of attack detection is improved, but computational resources and time consumption increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattack detection accuracyVSAvoidprocessing time
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The shadow model is trained to replicate the original model's behavior, allowing for direct comparison of responses. This copying approach enables precise attack detection by measuring deviations in responses while using efficient comparison methods that minimize processing time overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Data Source

PatentUS12050669B2Cloud based machine learning model attack guard
Publication Date: 2024.07.30 ORACLE INT CORP
  • US12050669B2 patent drawing
  • US12050669B2 patent drawing
  • US12050669B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Embodiments prevent a reverse engineering attack on a machine learning (“ML”) model. Embodiments receive a first set of requests from a plurality of users to the ML model. Based on the first set of requests, embodiments identify a first user attempting to attack the ML model and, in response to the identifying, generate a shadow model that is similar to the ML model. Embodiments receive a second set of requests from the first user to the ML model and, in response to the second set of requests, generate an ML model set of responses and a shadow model set of responses. Embodiments compare the ML model set of responses with the shadow model set of responses and, based on the comparison, determine whether the first user is attempting the reverse engineering attack on the ML model.