Shamir Secret Sharing for Secure Key Recovery
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing end-to-end secured electronic communication solutions face challenges in deployment within larger organizations due to concerns about compromising privacy and trust, as recovery mechanisms may allow unauthorized access to communications.
Innovation Solution
A computing platform and method that utilize Shamir-type operations to generate and distribute keys, enabling selective access and recovery of secured information while maintaining end-to-end encryption, by using a master key, basic key, and basic recovery key, ensuring that only authorized parties can access the content.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If a recovery mechanism is added to enable selective access to secured information, then organizational deployment and accessibility are improved, but the trust and privacy guarantees of end-to-end secured communication are compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The recovery key is segmented into multiple parts distributed to different parties. No single party can access the full recovery key alone; a threshold number of parts must be combined. This segmentation allows organizational deployment with controlled access while maintaining security, as the segmented structure prevents any single point of failure or unauthorized access.
Solution Approach 2:
A trusted intermediary system (the computing platform) is introduced to manage the key segmentation and reconstruction process. This intermediary enables the recovery mechanism without requiring direct access to communication content, thus maintaining end-to-end encryption while providing organizational oversight through the threshold-based reconstruction process.
2Reliability
If end-to-end encryption is maintained without recovery mechanisms, then trust and privacy are preserved, but accessibility and organizational adoption are limited
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting the recovery key into distributed parts, the system enables organizational deployment scenarios where multiple stakeholders need controlled access. The segmentation ensures that organizational policies can be enforced through threshold mechanisms while maintaining the cryptographic security that enables end-to-end encryption.
Solution Approach 2:
The key segmentation and distribution is performed in advance during key generation, before any communication occurs. This preliminary action establishes the recovery mechanism without affecting the security of ongoing communications, allowing organizations to adopt the system while maintaining trust and privacy guarantees throughout the communication lifecycle.
3Ease of operation
If recovery mechanisms allow arbitrary access to communications, then accessibility is improved, but the secured nature of end-to-end communication is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The recovery key is divided into multiple segments distributed to different parties, creating a threshold-based access control system. This segmentation prevents arbitrary access by requiring collaboration among multiple parties, thus reducing unauthorized access risk while maintaining controlled accessibility for legitimate recovery scenarios.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the access parameter from binary (access/no access) to threshold-based (m out of n parts required). This parameter change enables fine-grained control over recovery accessibility, allowing organizations to configure the threshold to balance ease of operation with security requirements, thereby reducing unauthorized access risk while maintaining legitimate accessibility.
Data Source
AI summary
Exemplary implementations may: at one of the user devices, generate a master key; at one of the user devices, generate a basic key; at one of the user devices, generate a basic recovery key; at one of the user devices, perform a Shamir-type operation for obtaining n parts where m or more parts are necessary to recover (or compute a copy of) the master key; at one of the user devices, encrypt, using the basic key, the basic portion of a database for the user, the database being remote from the user devices; and at one of the user devices, encrypt, using the basic recovery key, the master key for storage into the recovery portion of the database, the database being remote from the user devices and the basic portion of the database being uncompromised by recovery of the basic recovery key.