Shared Secret Verification Protocol Using Extracted Random Number Encryption
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing secure multi-party computation methods, such as those used for shared secret verification, are inefficient and require significant processing and storage resources, especially when verifying if two parties share the same secret without disclosing their identities or using a trusted third party.
Innovation Solution
A lean and efficient protocol where Alice encrypts a random number with Bob's public key and sends the result, which Bob then decrypts and hashes, allowing both parties to verify if they share the same secret without needing to encrypt all possible values, thereby reducing computational and storage burdens.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing secure multi-party computation methods are used for shared secret verification, then security is maintained, but processing and storage resources are significantly consumed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential verification function from the full MPC protocol, removing unnecessary computational steps. Instead of encrypting all possible values, the system uses a targeted approach where Alice encrypts only a random number with Bob's public key, then Bob decrypts and hashes the result. This extraction of core functionality reduces processing requirements while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies partial action by processing only the necessary portion of data rather than all possible values. The protocol processes a single random number encryption/decryption pair instead of requiring exhaustive processing of all potential secrets, thereby reducing computational burden while sufficient for verification purposes.
2Reliability
If existing secure multi-party computation methods are used for shared secret verification, then security is maintained, but storage resources are significantly consumed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential verification function from the full MPC protocol, removing unnecessary storage requirements. The system stores and processes only minimal data (random numbers and their encrypted forms) rather than requiring storage of all possible secret values or comprehensive lookup tables, thereby reducing storage resource consumption.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies partial action by storing and processing only the necessary portion of data. Instead of requiring storage of all possible encryption keys or secret values, the system stores only the random number and its encrypted form, significantly reducing storage requirements while maintaining verification capability.
3Reliability
If a trusted third party is used for verification, then verification reliability is improved, but system complexity and trust requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses cryptographic intermediaries (public key infrastructure and hash functions) to enable direct verification between parties without requiring a trusted third party. Bob's public key acts as an intermediary that allows Alice to encrypt information that only Bob can decrypt, eliminating the need for a central verification authority while maintaining verification reliability.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2
AI summary
Method for shared secret verification e.g. to be applied in secure data exchange, in which at least two parties, hereinafter indicated as Alice and Bob, each have a secret while their challenge is to find out whether they share the same secret or not, however, without disclosing the secret itself to each other or to any third party. The method comprises the following steps. In step 1, Alice picks a random number RA, encrypts it using Bob's public key PUB, adds the value of her secret SA, and sends the result K to Bob. In step 2 Bob receives K, subtracts his secret SB, and performs a decryption using his own private key PRB. In step3 Bob performs the one-way function H on Land sends the result M to Alice. In step 4 Alice receives M, takes her original random number RA, performs the same one-way function H and verifies whether the result equals the received M..In step 5 Alice sends her original random number RA to Bob. In step 6 Bob receives RA and verifies whether it equals to his earlier result Land concluding that, if the answer is "yes", Bob knows that Alice has the same secret and that, if the answer is "no" Bob knows Alice doesn't have the same secret. Instead of performing the steps 6 and 7, Alice and Bob may repeat steps 1 to 5 where it is Bob who starts the exchange.