Shielding Mesh Circuit for Semiconductor Physical Attack Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
The increasing number of circuits requiring protection in system semiconductors leads to higher hardware overhead and longer test cycles, making it challenging to effectively detect physical attacks such as microprobing and circuit editing attacks.
Innovation Solution
A security circuit that uses a shielding layer with a mesh structure and a processor to transmit pulse signals and measure signal delay times, employing a counter to differentiate between normal and attack states by determining differences in counter outputs, thereby reducing hardware overhead and improving detection accuracy.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the number of circuits requiring protection increases, then security coverage is improved, but hardware overhead and test cycle increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies a universal detection mechanism where a single security circuit using TDR technology can detect multiple types of physical attacks (microprobing, FIB, deep sub-micron attacks) across multiple circuits simultaneously. The transmission line serves as both the signal pathway and the detection medium, eliminating the need for separate detection circuits for each protected circuit, thus reducing hardware overhead while maintaining comprehensive security coverage.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a mesh-shaped transmission line as an intermediary structure that covers the semiconductor chip. This transmission line acts as a mediator between the security detection system and the protected circuits, allowing indirect detection of physical attacks without requiring direct integration with each circuit. The transmission line reflects signals when attacked, providing detection capability while maintaining circuit independence and reducing overall system complexity.
2Reliability
If the number of circuits requiring protection increases, then security coverage is improved, but test cycle increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent enables continuous monitoring capability where the security circuit can detect physical attacks in real-time during chip operation. The TDR-based detection system continuously sends test signals through the transmission line and monitors for reflections, allowing uninterrupted security surveillance. This eliminates the need for discrete test cycles for each circuit, as the system provides ongoing protection and detection across all covered circuits simultaneously.
Solution Approach 2:
The universal transmission line structure allows a single test signal to probe multiple circuits simultaneously. When a physical attack occurs anywhere along the transmission line or on covered circuits, the signal reflection pattern changes, enabling detection of multiple attack scenarios through a single detection mechanism. This multi-functional approach reduces the cumulative test time required to secure multiple circuits compared to individual circuit testing.
3Measurement precision
If traditional detection methods are used for each circuit, then detection accuracy is maintained, but hardware overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The transmission line serves as an intermediary detection layer that maintains high detection accuracy without requiring direct integration with each circuit. By monitoring signal reflections from the transmission line, the system can accurately detect physical attacks (microprobing, FIB, deep sub-micron) while keeping the detection hardware separate from and independent of the protected circuits, thus reducing overall hardware overhead while preserving detection precision.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces traditional direct circuit integration methods with electromagnetic field-based TDR detection. Instead of mechanically or electrically integrating separate detection circuits with each protected circuit, the system uses electromagnetic signal propagation and reflection through the transmission line to detect attacks. This substitution maintains detection accuracy through electromagnetic field interactions while significantly reducing hardware complexity and integration requirements.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
The solution effectively reduces hardware overhead and analysis time while increasing the accuracy of detecting microprobing and circuit editing attacks, providing a reliable security mechanism for system semiconductors.
Implementation Method 1
check a first point in time when a voltage value of a first reflected signal, which is a signal formed by reflection of the first step pulse signal at a second point of the transmission line
Implementation Method 2
check a first point in time when a voltage value of a first reflected signal reaches a first voltage value at the first point, and store first counter output corresponding to the first point in time into a register
Data Source
AI summary
The present disclosure relates to a security circuit for detecting physical attacks on a system semiconductor. The security circuit includes at least: a shielding layer having a mesh structure composed of a transmission line; a processor configured to determine that a focused ion beam (FIB) circuit editing attack was detected when a difference between predetermined counter output and a first counter output is less than a first reference value; determine that a microprobing attack was detected when a difference between the second counter output and the first counter output exceeds a second reference value; and output an alarm signal when detecting the circuit editing attack or the microprobing attack.