SIM-Based OTP Verification for SIM Swap Fraud Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
SIM swap fraud exploits the weakness in two-factor authentication (2FA) by hijacking a mobile phone number, allowing fraudsters to intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) and access victim accounts, with existing solutions like blocking OTP delivery for a period being undesirable due to lack of user remedial action.
Innovation Solution
A SIM secure framework that tracks the SIM card associated with a mobile phone number during 2FA registration and checks for consistency before delivering subsequent OTPs, using a mapped SIM indicator (SIM secure framework) to ensure the same SIM card is used, allowing users to reinstate their phone number after fraud.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If SIM swap fraud prevention is implemented by tracking SIM card consistency, then security against fraud is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a SIM indicator as an intermediary element that mediates between the service provider and the SIM card. This indicator is obtained from the mobile network operator and used to verify SIM card consistency without requiring the service provider to directly track or manage SIM card details, thus improving security while minimizing the increase in system complexity
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary verification by obtaining and storing the SIM indicator during the initial 2FA registration process. This preliminary action allows the system to have the SIM card identity established before any potential fraud occurs, enabling quick verification in subsequent OTP deliveries without adding complex real-time tracking mechanisms
2Reliability
If SIM card consistency checking is performed for every OTP delivery, then fraud prevention effectiveness is improved, but processing time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The SIM indicator is obtained and stored in advance during the 2FA registration process, before any OTP deliveries occur. This preliminary action means that during subsequent OTP deliveries, the system only needs to compare the current SIM indicator with the stored one, rather than performing comprehensive SIM card verification each time, thus maintaining high fraud prevention effectiveness while minimizing verification time
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the verification parameter from comprehensive SIM card details to a simplified SIM indicator. This parameter change allows for rapid comparison and verification while maintaining the essential security function of detecting SIM card changes, effectively reducing processing time without compromising fraud prevention effectiveness
Data Source
AI summary
A method of utilizing a SIM card as a security key for subscriber identity module (SIM) swap prevention is described. The method includes receiving, from a service provider, an initial one-time password (OTP) delivery request comprising an OTP message, a mobile station international subscriber directory number (MSISDN) destined to receive the OTP message, and a SIM indicator associated with the MSISDN; determining, based on the OTP delivery request, a current international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) associated with the MSISDN; obtaining, from a datastore based on the SIM indicator associated with the MSISDN, an IMSI of record for the MSISDN; comparing the current IMSI associated with the MSISDN and the IMSI of record for the MSISDN; and determining, based on the comparing, whether to deliver the OTP message to the MSISDN or block delivery of the OTP message to the MSISDN.