SIM Swap Authentication via Risk Scores and Biometrics
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Solution Overview
Problem
The convenience of SIM swap services in mobile communication systems has created a security gap that allows fraudulent actors to circumvent multi-factor authentication, enabling them to intercept verification codes and access financial accounts by impersonating users.
Innovation Solution
Assigning a risk score to user accounts based on activity and location history, and requesting biometric signatures to authenticate SIM card transfers, thereby verifying the legitimacy of SIM swap requests and enhancing security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If SIM swap service is made convenient and easy to process, then user experience and service accessibility are improved, but security vulnerability increases allowing fraudulent actors to intercept verification codes
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary risk assessment and authentication actions before completing the SIM swap process. Risk scores are calculated in advance based on user behavior patterns, device history, and location data. Authentication challenges are sent to the original device before the SIM swap is finalized, ensuring that the user is still present and authorized before the fraudulent actor can complete the transaction.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements continuous feedback loops where risk scores are dynamically adjusted based on user interactions and device behavior. The mobile service provider receives feedback about authentication attempts, device locations, and user actions, and uses this information to update risk assessments in real-time. This allows the system to adapt to changing conditions and detect fraudulent patterns as they emerge.
2Reliability
If multi-factor authentication is implemented with SMS verification, then authentication security is improved, but fraudulent actors can still circumvent the process by intercepting verification codes
Solution Approach 1:
The system introduces an intermediary risk assessment layer between the authentication request and the verification code delivery. Instead of directly sending verification codes to the new SIM card, the system first evaluates the risk score and may require additional authentication steps. This intermediary layer prevents direct interception of verification codes by blocking the delivery path to compromised devices.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary authentication challenges before delivering verification codes. By sending authentication requests to the original device first and requiring user confirmation, the system ensures that the user is still present and authorized before any verification codes are sent to the new SIM card, preventing fraudulent interception.
3Reliability
If risk-based authentication mechanisms are added to verify SIM swap legitimacy, then security against fraudulent requests is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into distinct modules: risk score calculation module, authentication challenge module, verification code delivery module, and risk adjustment module. Each module handles a specific aspect of the authentication process independently, making the complex system more manageable and maintainable. The risk score calculation, for example, operates separately from the verification code delivery, allowing for independent optimization and failure isolation.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements self-service authentication where the mobile service provider automatically calculates risk scores and sends authentication challenges without requiring manual intervention. The process is automated and handles itself through programmed logic that evaluates risk factors and delivers appropriate authentication steps, reducing the need for complex manual procedures while maintaining high security standards.
4Stability of the object's composition
If the mobile service provider continues switching wireless service to the first UE during SIM swap, then service continuity is maintained, but the user may be exposed to fraudulent authentication attempts
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary authentication challenges while maintaining service continuity. By sending authentication requests to the original device before the SIM swap is completed, the system ensures that the user is still present and authorized while the service switching process continues in the background. This allows both service continuity and authentication protection to coexist.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically adjusts the authentication process based on real-time conditions. If the risk score indicates high probability of fraud, the system may pause or modify the service switching process to require additional authentication steps. This dynamic adjustment allows the system to maintain service continuity under normal conditions while providing enhanced protection when fraud is detected.
Data Source
AI summary
A method of computer authentication of a user request for a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card transfer by a biometric signature from a user equipment (UE) comprising assigning a risk score, by a mobile service provider, to a user account based on user activity in the user account, wherein the user activity includes a SIM card transfer authorization. The mobile service provider then sends a message requesting a biometric signature from an authentication application executing in memory on the UE. The authentication application on the UE then proceeds capturing a biometric signature, encrypting the biometric signature, and sending an encrypted biometric signature to the mobile service provider using a wireless communication protocol. The mobile service provider then compares the biometric signature to an authorized signature and modifies the risk score based on the comparison.