SMS Message Signing via SMPP Field Hash Embedding
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Solution Overview
Problem
Individuals and organizations face security and data integrity risks in the transmission and receipt of text messages due to modifications and corruption by malicious actors and processing errors.
Innovation Solution
The use of signed tokens to verify short message service (SMS) message bodies through cryptographic key pairs, where a public key is published and a private key is used to sign the SMS message, embedding a cryptographic hash in an SMPP field for validation by a downstream system.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional SMS transmission is used without cryptographic signing, then message transmission is simple and fast, but message integrity and authenticity cannot be guaranteed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries (hash functions and digital signatures) as mediators between the sender and receiver. The hash function acts as an intermediary to create a compact representation of the message, while digital signatures serve as intermediaries to provide authentication and integrity verification without requiring the recipients to directly trust the senders
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces traditional mechanical trust mechanisms (such as manual verification or trusted third-party intermediaries) with cryptographic mathematical mechanisms. Instead of relying on physical security or human verification, the system uses cryptographic hash functions and digital signature algorithms to automatically verify message integrity and authenticity
2Reliability
If cryptographic signing is implemented for SMS messages, then message authenticity and integrity are verified, but processing time and computational resources increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the cryptographic verification process into distinct phases: hash computation during message creation, signature generation, and verification at the receiving end. This segmentation allows parallel processing and optimization of each stage independently, reducing overall verification time while maintaining security
Solution Approach 2:
The patent employs parameter optimization in cryptographic operations, such as selecting appropriate hash function parameters and signature algorithm parameters that balance security requirements with computational efficiency. By carefully choosing cryptographic parameters, the system achieves adequate security with minimized processing overhead
3Reliability
If digital signatures are embedded in SMS messages, then tampering detection is enabled, but message size and data overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential cryptographic elements (hash values and signature data) from the complete cryptographic verification process and embeds them in the SMS message. Rather than including entire cryptographic keys or redundant verification data, the system extracts and includes only the minimal necessary components for tampering detection
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements partial cryptographic signing where only critical portions of the message or specific message attributes are signed, rather than the entire message content. This partial action approach provides sufficient tampering detection for the most important message elements while minimizing the amount of cryptographic data that needs to be transmitted and stored
Data Source
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AI summary
Aspects of the disclosure relate to message verification. A computing platform may generate (310) a cryptographic key pair comprising a public key and a private key. The computing platform may publish (315), to a server, the public key. The computing platform may generate a short message service (SMS) message. The computing platform may sign (325), using the private key, the SMS message, which may include computing a cryptographic hash of the SMS message using the private key and embedding the cryptographic hash in an SMPP field of the SMS message. The computing platform may send (330), to a downstream computing system, the signed SMS message, where the downstream computing system may be configured to validate the signed SMS message using the cryptographic hash embedded in the SMPP field of the SMS message and by accessing the public key.