SoC Trust Provisioning Validation via Key Comparison
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Solution Overview
Problem
The existing system-on-chip (SoC) trust provisioning methods are vulnerable to security compromises due to the leakage of secure assets during testing, allowing compromised keys and assets to be written at secure locations, thereby bypassing the trust provisioning operation and compromising the security of the SoC.
Innovation Solution
A system and method that includes a first memory, a trust provisioning system, a one-time programmable (OTP) element, and a comparator to validate the trust provisioning operation by comparing secret keys, ensuring that only validated secure assets are accessed, thereby preventing unauthorized access and maintaining security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If secure assets are stored at secure memory locations and trust provisioning operation is executed, then the security of the SoC is improved, but during testing the location of secure assets may be leaked and compromised keys may be written at secure locations
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by storing a first secret key in a first memory before the trust provisioning operation is executed. This pre-stored key is used later to validate the integrity of secure assets after they are provisioned to the OTP element, preventing compromised assets from being used without detection.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback through a comparator that compares the first secret key (stored before provisioning) with a second secret key (stored after provisioning in OTP). This comparison provides feedback on whether the trust provisioning operation maintained security, generating a valid signal that indicates whether secure assets are compromised.
2Manufacturing precision
If testing is performed on secure memory locations to check erase and program functionalities, then the manufacturing quality is improved, but the location of secure assets may be leaked and compromised assets may bypass trust provisioning operation
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the secret key storage and validation process into distinct phases: a first secret key is stored in a first memory before provisioning, and a second secret key is stored in an OTP element after provisioning. This segmentation allows testing of memory locations while maintaining security through the comparator validation mechanism.
Solution Approach 2:
The comparator acts as an intermediary between the first memory and the OTP element, comparing secret keys without exposing secure asset locations during testing. This intermediary mechanism enables quality testing while preventing information leakage about secure asset locations.
3Ease of operation
If compromised keys are written at secure locations during testing, then the device complexity is reduced by allowing writing operations, but the trust provisioning operation is bypassed and security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by pre-storing a first secret key before trust provisioning operation. This pre-stored key serves as a reference to detect and prevent compromised keys from being written during testing, counteracting potential security breaches before they can affect system operation.
Solution Approach 2:
The comparator provides feedback by comparing the first secret key with the second secret key stored in OTP. This feedback mechanism detects whether compromised keys were written during testing, generating a valid signal that indicates the integrity of the trust provisioning operation and preventing unauthorized access.
Data Source
AI summary
A system-on-chip (SoC) includes a memory, a trust provisioning system, a one-time programmable (OTP) element, and a comparator. The memory is configured to store a first secret key before an execution of a trust provisioning operation. The trust provisioning system is configured to receive an encrypted version of a first set of secure assets and one of a second secret key and an encrypted version of the second secret key, and execute the trust provisioning operation on the SoC to store the first set of secure assets and the second secret key in the OTP element. The comparator is configured to compare the first and second secret keys to generate a valid signal that is indicative of a validation of the trust provisioning operation. The first set of secure assets and a second set of secure assets associated with the SoC are accessible based on the valid signal.