Software Decoy for DDoS Attack Mitigation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current mitigation solutions for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are slow to react, often exceeding the duration of the attack, and are ineffective against large-scale attacks that overwhelm infrastructure with traffic from numerous IP addresses, making it difficult to distinguish between legitimate and compromised devices.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a software decoy within the infrastructure to receive malware, extract the command and control (C&C) server's address, connect to the C&C server, and forward DDoS attack particulars to a cleaning component for discarding malicious signals, while using previously detected ciphering keys to decipher encrypted malware and performing static analysis to locate the C&C server's address.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Speed
If conventional mitigation solutions are used, then DDoS attacks can be blocked, but the reaction time is too slow and often exceeds the duration of the attack
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by installing software decoys that proactively attract and capture malware before it can launch a DDoS attack. The decoys are positioned in advance to intercept malware distribution, allowing the system to extract C&C server addresses and prepare mitigation strategies before the actual attack occurs, thereby significantly reducing reaction time.
Solution Approach 2:
The system segments the infrastructure by deploying multiple software decoys at different locations rather than using a single centralized mitigation point. This segmentation allows parallel monitoring and capture of malware from multiple vectors simultaneously, improving both the speed of detection and the reliability of mitigation by distributing the protective function across multiple independent components.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If blacklisting of IP addresses is implemented, then some harmful traffic can be blocked, but legitimate devices with dynamically assigned IP addresses are also blocked
Solution Approach 1:
The system introduces software decoys as intermediaries between legitimate traffic and potential malware sources. Instead of directly blocking IP addresses that may belong to legitimate devices, the decoys act as mediators that attract and isolate malware, extract C&C server addresses, and enable targeted mitigation against the actual attack sources without affecting legitimate devices with dynamically assigned IP addresses.
3Loss of time
If software decoys are deployed to capture malware, then rapid identification of C&C servers is achieved, but the infrastructure complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system creates simplified copies of vulnerable devices in the form of software decoys. These decoys replicate the essential characteristics of vulnerable devices that malware targets, allowing them to attract and capture malware without requiring complex analysis systems. The copying approach reduces the complexity of malware analysis by providing ready-to-examine samples that contain embedded C&C server addresses.
Solution Approach 2:
The system replaces complex mechanical malware analysis systems with a simpler information extraction approach. Instead of using resource-intensive dynamic analysis or sophisticated heuristic scanning, the software decoys passively capture malware and enable direct extraction of C&C server addresses from the captured samples, substituting complex analytical mechanisms with a simpler capture-and-extract workflow.
Data Source
AI summary
Methods and systems for defending an infrastructure against a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack use a software decoy installed in the infrastructure to deliberately attract a malware. An address or a domain name of a command and control (C&C) server is extracted from the malware. A client of the infrastructure uses the address or the domain name of the C&C server to connect to the C&C server. The client receives a command intended by the C&C server to cause the client to participate in the DDoS attack. The client forwards particulars of the DDoS attack to a cleaning component. The cleaning component discards incoming signals having one or more of the particulars of the DDoS attack. The address or domain name of the C&C server may be obfuscated in the malware, in which case reverse engineering is used to decipher the malware.