Software-Based Computing Platform Integrity Verification

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing TPM-based solutions for verifying the integrity of a computing platform require hardware security features, excluding billions of systems without them from secure integrity measurement, making them vulnerable to malicious attacks.

Innovation Solution

A method to verify the integrity of a computing platform by measuring and comparing multi-dimensional execution states between a secure and a target platform, using self-referential measurements along time, space, and number dimensions, allowing for secure execution and detection of adversarial interference.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If TPM-based solutions are used to verify computing platform integrity, then measurement precision is improved, but device complexity increases due to hardware requirements

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveintegrity measurement capabilityVSAvoidhardware security features
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent replaces the hardware-based TPM mechanism with a software-based execution state measurement approach. Instead of relying on physical security hardware, the system measures execution states (register values, memory contents, instruction sequences) during code execution to verify integrity, thereby substituting mechanical/hardware security with software-based verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a virtual copy of the execution state rather than relying on the physical hardware state. By measuring and recording the sequence of execution states and comparing them against expected values, the system verifies integrity without needing special hardware, effectively copying the security verification function into software.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

2Reliability

If TPM hardware is required for integrity verification, then reliability is improved, but adaptability deteriorates as billions of systems without TPM are excluded

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveintegrity verificationVSAvoidsystem compatibility
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent makes the integrity verification mechanism universal by implementing it through software that can run on any computing platform regardless of hardware capabilities. The execution state measurement approach works on systems with or without TPM, enabling the same verification method to adapt to diverse hardware environments including billions of systems without specialized security hardware.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

3Measurement precision

If correct implementation of TPM architecture is required, then measurement precision is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecure code measurementVSAvoidsecurity architecture implementation
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the essential security verification function from the complex TPM architecture. Instead of requiring complete implementation of TPM hardware and software architecture, the system isolates and implements only the core functionality of measuring execution states and comparing them against expected values, thereby achieving secure measurement without the complexity of full TPM implementation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS11748481B1Verifying the integrity of a computing platform
Publication Date: 2023.09.05 HAMLIN CHRISTOPHER LUIS
  • US11748481B1 patent drawing
  • US11748481B1 patent drawing
  • US11748481B1 patent drawing

AI summary

At least a portion of a software image may be executed on a first instance of a computing platform. A first sequence of multi-dimensional execution states may be measured that the first instance of the computing platform passes through when executing the portion of the software image. The portion of the software image may then be executed on a second instance of the computing platform. A second sequence of multi-dimensional execution states may be measured that the second instance of the computing platform passes through when executing the portion of the software image. The integrity of the second instance of the computing platform may be verified with respect to the first instance of the computing platform by comparing the first sequence of multi-dimensional execution states with the second sequence of multi-dimensional execution states.