Software Verification Device Hash Comparison
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing secure boot technologies are slow due to signature verification for each software activation and cannot detect downgrade attacks that restore software to old versions, nor can they verify software integrity without external server communication.
Innovation Solution
A software verification device with a security calculation unit that stores and compares hash values of activation software, performing signature verification only when necessary, and storing hash values to speed up the process and detect integrity issues locally.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If signature verification is performed for each software activation, then software integrity can be verified, but activation speed decreases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent pre-calculates and stores hash expected values of software in the storing unit before activation. During activation, the security calculation unit directly compares the calculated hash value with the pre-stored expected value, eliminating the need for time-consuming signature verification while maintaining integrity checking capability.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the essential integrity verification function from the full signature verification process. By storing only the hash expected values and comparing them with calculated hash values, the system retains the core integrity verification capability while removing the computationally intensive signature verification step.
2Ease of operation
If hash values are stored locally in the device, then verification can be performed without external server communication, but the device cannot detect downgrade attacks to old versions
Solution Approach 1:
The patent pre-stores hash expected values of legitimate software versions in the storing unit. When activation occurs, the security calculation unit compares the calculated hash value with these pre-stored expected values. If the hash matches, the software is confirmed to be the correct version, thereby detecting downgrade attacks without needing external server communication.
3Reliability
If signature verification is performed for every software, then security is maintained, but verification time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the essential integrity verification function from the full signature verification process. By storing only the hash expected values and comparing them with calculated hash values, the system retains the core security verification capability while removing the computationally intensive signature verification step, significantly reducing verification time.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses lightweight hash value comparisons instead of heavy signature verification. The hash expected values are simple data structures that can be quickly compared, replacing the complex cryptographic signature verification process with a much faster and simpler operation.
Data Source
AI summary
When a hash expected value, which is an expected value of a hash value of activation software, is stored in a storing unit (111), a security calculation unit (110) compares the hash value of the activation software with the hash expected value. A main calculation unit (109) activates the activation software when the hash value and the hash expected value match, and stops a process when both do not match. The main calculation unit (109) performs signature verification for the activation software when the hash expected value is not stored in the storing unit (111), and stores in the storing unit (111) as the hash value expected value, the hash value of the activation software as well as activates the activation software when the signature verification is successful. The main calculation unit (109) stops a process when the signature verification is not successful.