Speculative Execution Processor Side Channel Attack Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Speculative execution processors are vulnerable to side channel attacks, and existing solutions to protect them often result in significant performance degradation.
Innovation Solution
A system that separates the execution and commit stages by storing speculative instructions in an internal cache memory inaccessible to external processing units and copying only the committed code segment into an external memory, while measuring and delaying the commit time to maintain security without compromising performance.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If speculative instructions are stored in an internal cache memory inaccessible to external processing units, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but access speed and performance deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides memory into two distinct segments: an internal cache memory for speculative instructions that is inaccessible to external processing units, and an external memory for committed instructions that is accessible. This segmentation isolates speculative operations to protect against side channel attacks while maintaining normal memory access for committed operations, thereby resolving the contradiction between security and access speed.
2Reliability
If the commit stage is delayed to maintain security, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but system productivity deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary action by pre-executing instructions speculatively in the internal cache memory before formal commitment. This allows the system to prepare results in advance during the first time period, then quickly commit them during the second time period without causing significant delays to overall system productivity, while maintaining security through the isolated execution environment.
3Speed
If speculative execution is performed ahead of time, then processing speed is improved, but vulnerability to side channel attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism - the internal cache memory that is inaccessible to external processing units - between the speculative execution engine and the external system. This intermediary allows speculative execution to proceed at high speed while preventing external observers from gaining information through side channel attacks, thus resolving the contradiction between processing speed and security vulnerability.
Data Source
AI summary
A system, a method and a computer program product for protecting a speculative execution processor from side channel attacks, are disclosed. The system comprises a processing circuitry which performs an execution of a code segment, in one time period and copies, in another time period, only a committed portion of the executed code segment into a memory component which is accessible to read actions by an external processing unit. The speculative instructions are stored in an internal cache memory which is not accessible to read actions by the external processing unit.