Multi-Party Authentication via Split Key Cryptography

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current user authentication methods, such as password-based systems and multi-factor authentication, are vulnerable to brute-force attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, especially when credentials are reused across multiple services, leading to security concerns and unauthorized access.

Innovation Solution

Implementing message verification using key-splitting and public key cryptography, where a server and client system establish an asymmetric key-pair and split the private key into components, with each entity storing some components, allowing for independent signature generation and verification without relying on a secure connection.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If password-based authentication is used, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to brute-force attacks and credential reuse

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of authenticationVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The private key is split into multiple components distributed between the server system and client system. Each party holds only a portion of the private key, making it impossible for either party alone to compromise the entire authentication mechanism. This segmentation resolves the contradiction by maintaining security while enabling operation without transmitting sensitive credentials.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces traditional password-based mechanical authentication with a cryptographic system based on mathematical problems (factoring large integers or discrete logarithms). This substitution eliminates the vulnerability to brute-force attacks while maintaining ease of operation through automated cryptographic processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

2Reliability

If multi-factor authentication is implemented, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidauthentication system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges the authentication factors into a single cryptographic operation. Instead of requiring separate verification steps for different factors, the split-key mechanism combines multiple security considerations (server security, client security, credential protection) into one unified authentication exchange, reducing overall system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

3Ease of operation

If credentials are stored centrally, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to single point of failure

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecredential managementVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication credentials (private key components) are segmented and distributed between multiple parties (server and client) rather than stored centrally. This eliminates the single point of failure while maintaining ease of operation because the authentication process automatically manages the distributed credentials without requiring user intervention.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS11606348B2User authentication using multi-party computation and public key cryptography
Publication Date: 2023.03.14 SALESFORCE INC
  • US11606348B2 patent drawing
  • US11606348B2 patent drawing
  • US11606348B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Techniques are disclosed relating to user authentication using multi-party computation and public key cryptography. In some embodiments, a server may receive, from a client, a request to authenticate a user to a service. The server may access key-pair information that includes, for a server key-pair, a first component of a server private key and, for a client key-pair, a client public key and a first component of a client private key. The server may generate a partial signature value that is based on the first component, but not the entirety, of the server private key. The server may send, to the client, an authentication challenge that includes challenge information and the partial signature value. The server may then determine whether to authenticate the user based on an authentication response from the client.