Split-Server Authentication with Silent Alarms and Drifting Keys

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing one-time authentication token systems are vulnerable to seed leakage attacks and lack an end-to-end server-side architecture that simultaneously supports split-server verification, silent alarms, and drifting keys, making them susceptible to token compromise and cloning.

Innovation Solution

A server-side architecture that integrates split-server passcode verification with silent alarms and drifting keys, using two forward-secure pseudorandom number generators (FS-PRNGs) to generate passcodes that embed auxiliary information, including silent alarm and drifting key states, to enhance security and detect potential token compromises and cloning attempts.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If split-server verification protocol is used to protect against seed leakage, then security against server-side attacks is improved, but system complexity increases due to multiple servers and distributed verification

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against seed leakageVSAvoidsystem architecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication secret is segmented into multiple partial secrets distributed across different servers. Each server holds only a portion of the secret, making it impossible for any single server to compromise the entire authentication mechanism. This segmentation directly addresses the seed leakage vulnerability by ensuring that even if one server is compromised, the attacker cannot obtain the complete authentication secret.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If silent alarm and drifting key mechanisms are integrated into the authentication system, then detection capability against token compromise is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capability against token compromiseVSAvoidauthentication system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by embedding silent alarm and drifting key mechanisms into the authentication token before actual use. These mechanisms are pre-configured to detect compromise attempts, allowing the system to identify and respond to threats before they can fully exploit the authentication system. The silent alarm is triggered in advance of actual compromise, and drifting keys detect cloning attempts before they succeed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If multiple security mechanisms are combined in a single authentication system, then overall security resilience is improved, but ease of operation deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoverall security resilienceVSAvoiduser access control complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

Multiple security mechanisms (split-server verification, silent alarm, drifting keys) are merged into a unified authentication system that operates transparently to the user. The system combines these mechanisms in such a way that they work together seamlessly, with the authentication server coordinating the verification processes and presenting a single, unified authentication interface to users, thereby maintaining ease of operation despite the complex security measures.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Data Source

PatentUS10091204B1Controlling user access to protected resource based on outcome of one-time passcode authentication token and predefined access policy
Publication Date: 2018.10.02 RSA SECURITY USA LLC
  • US10091204B1 patent drawing
  • US10091204B1 patent drawing
  • US10091204B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Techniques are provided for controlling user access to a protected resource based on an outcome of a one-time passcode authentication token and one or more predefined access policies. An exemplary method comprises the steps of: providing an authentication passcode generated by a token associated with a user to at least one authentication processing device, wherein the user is attempting to access a protected resource; receiving an authentication outcome from the at least one authentication processing device, the authentication outcome comprising an acceptance outcome of the received authentication passcode and at least one of an acceptance outcome with respect to one or more different signals, such as a silent alarm and an acceptance outcome with respect to a drifting key; and providing access of the user to the protected resource based on the authentication outcome and a predefined access policy. Predefined access policies that are specific to silent alarm alerts and drifting key alerts are also provided.