Stateful Hash Chains for Authenticating System Event Logs
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Solution Overview
Problem
In multi-tenant resource environments, unauthorized operating systems can send unauthentic system event logs, leading to potential denial-of-service attacks and unnecessary manual maintenance, which are costly and time-consuming.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a stateful hash mechanism for authenticating system event log messages, where the BIOS includes a hash value generated using secret hashing parameters, allowing the BMC to verify the authenticity of the messages by matching the hash values.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If system event logs are sent without authentication, then the system is simpler and faster, but unauthorized operating systems can send fake logs leading to denial-of-service attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-configuring the BMC with the correct hash algorithm and initialization vector before the authentication process begins. The BMC proactively prepares the authentication framework, including storing the hash algorithm identifier and initializing the stateful hash chain, so that when system event logs arrive, authentication can be performed efficiently without requiring complex real-time setup or configuration.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism in the form of a stateful hash chain that mediates between the BIOS and the BMC. This hash chain acts as a trusted intermediary that carries forward authentication state across multiple system event logs, allowing the BMC to verify authenticity without requiring direct complex communication protocols between all system components. The hash chain state is passed through the system event log structure itself.
2Reliability
If stateful hash authentication is implemented, then unauthorized systems are blocked, but the system requires maintaining state and processing overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies continuity of useful action by maintaining a persistent stateful hash chain that continues across multiple system event logs without interruption. Once the hash chain is initialized, each subsequent system event log authentication builds upon the previous state, creating an unbroken chain of verification. This continuous state maintenance allows for efficient incremental authentication without requiring re-initialization or restarting the verification process for each log entry.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback by incorporating the hash of the previous system event log into the current system event log structure. This creates a feedback loop where the authentication state from one log entry feeds into the verification of the next log entry. The BMC uses the feedback from previous authentication states to efficiently verify current logs, and can detect tampering or unauthorized modifications through this continuous feedback mechanism.
3Reliability
If manual maintenance is performed for every system event log, then all issues are addressed, but it is costly and time-consuming for data center staff
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies self-service by enabling the system to automatically detect and respond to unauthorized operating systems through the authentication mechanism. The BMC can autonomously identify when a system event log fails authentication and trigger appropriate remedial actions without requiring manual intervention from data center staff. This automated self-service capability maintains system reliability while significantly improving staff efficiency by eliminating routine manual checks for authentication failures.
Data Source
AI summary
Communications, such as system event log messages, can be authenticated using a hash value included in the messages. In some embodiments, the hash can be generated using secret hash parameters to generate a hash of the prior message in the sequence. The hash is stored to BIOS memory that is inaccessible, or at least not exposed, to an operating system executing on the computing device. A recipient, such as the BMC on the computing device, receiving these messages over an appropriate interface can compare the received and expected hash values in order to attempt to authenticate those messages. Authenticated messages can be processed, while unauthenticated messages can be dropped and remedial action taken as appropriate.