Storage Access Monitoring for Endpoint-Free Ransomware Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing methods for detecting ransomware attacks are ineffective against unknown patterns, require endpoint software updates, and fail to prevent data encryption and exfiltration, especially when countermeasures are not fully implemented.

Innovation Solution

A storage access monitoring method that analyzes operation information from storage devices to detect ransomware by comparing current and past behavior patterns, ratios, and statistical trends, providing early detection and prevention of data encryption and exfiltration.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If virus checking software is used to detect ransomware, then known ransomware patterns can be detected and removed, but unknown ransomware patterns cannot be detected

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveransomware detection capabilityVSAvoiddetection coverage against unknown patterns
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by collecting operation information and establishing baseline behavior patterns before ransomware infection occurs. By pre-configuring normal operation profiles and monitoring thresholds, the system is prepared to detect deviations indicating ransomware activity, enabling early detection without requiring endpoint software or pattern matching

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

Instead of detecting ransomware directly through pattern matching at the endpoint, the system inverts the approach by monitoring storage device operations for abnormal patterns that indicate ransomware activity. This indirect detection method identifies encryption behavior through its impact on storage operations rather than through viral signatures

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Solution Approach 3:

The storage device serves as an intermediary monitoring point between the ransomware and the data. By placing monitoring at the storage layer, the system can detect ransomware encryption behavior as it manifests in storage operations, providing a neutral observation point that does not require endpoint software

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If virus checking software is installed on all endpoints, then detection coverage is improved, but system complexity and maintenance burden increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection coverageVSAvoidsoftware deployment and maintenance
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The detection function is extracted from the endpoint devices and relocated to the storage device. This eliminates the need for virus checking software on endpoints while maintaining detection capability, as the storage device independently monitors its own operations for ransomware indicators

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The storage device performs self-monitoring of its operations to detect ransomware activity. By having the storage device analyze its own operation information for abnormal patterns, the system eliminates dependency on external endpoint software while maintaining autonomous detection capability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If backup data is stored in inaccessible Vault area, then data protection from ransomware is improved, but identification of pre-infection backup data becomes time-consuming

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata protectionVSAvoidrecovery time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements continuous feedback monitoring of storage operations, tracking encryption-like patterns in real-time. This ongoing monitoring provides immediate alerts when ransomware activity is detected, enabling rapid response before backup recovery becomes necessary and eliminating the need for time-consuming retrospective analysis

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

By detecting ransomware activity through operation pattern analysis before encryption completes, the system enables preliminary protective actions such as isolating the infected system or triggering automated backup to known-good states, significantly reducing recovery time compared to post-infection backup verification

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Reliability

If file access log monitoring is implemented, then ransomware detection capability is improved, but system complexity and resource requirements increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveransomware detectionVSAvoidmonitoring system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The monitoring is performed locally at the storage device where the actual encryption operations occur. By analyzing operation information directly at the storage layer rather than collecting and analyzing logs from multiple endpoints, the system reduces complexity while maintaining detection effectiveness

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The system monitors only the critical storage operation patterns that indicate ransomware activity rather than implementing comprehensive endpoint log collection. By focusing on specific encryption-related operation patterns, the system achieves effective detection with minimal complexity and resource requirements

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Data Source

PatentUS20250335590A1Storage access monitoring method and storage access monitoring device
Publication Date: 2025.10.30 HITACHI SYST LTD
  • US20250335590A1 patent drawing
  • US20250335590A1 patent drawing
  • US20250335590A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A storage access monitoring method acquires the operation status of a volume constituting a storage device from which an endpoint (host) can read/write data through a network as operation information, and determines whether or not a behavior related to the latest operation information is abnormal by performing any one or more of a comparative analysis step, a pattern comparison step, or a trend comparison step. The comparative analysis step includes comparing the latest operation information with past operation information. The pattern comparison step includes determining whether or not there is a behavioral pattern that indicates a possibility of an effect of the ransomware in the latest operation information. The trend comparison step includes determining whether or not an operation related to the latest operation information is different from a normal operation related to the past operation information.